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P R E F A C E .
Our aim in this thesis will he critically to study Dewey’s 
theory of moral values witn a view to discovering hew far the 
naturalistic, biological point of view, as this is conceived by 
Dewey, is capable, when applied in the realm of Ethics, of 
adequately interpreting the facts of moral life.
F.or this purpose, we snail begin with a critical study of 
Dewey's biological psychology, which we shall find in the end to 
be responsible for his entire ethical theory, followed by a 
critical study of his nominalistic Logic, which, in our opinion, 
is the result of ^  psychology and comes to determine his views
A
in Ethics. These two sections, tnen, since they provide a
criticism of tne basic ideas on which Dewey’s ethical theory is
built, will be dealt with at some length. The third and fourth
sections will be concerned witn a statement and criticism of
Dewey’s ethical theory. •
The references throughout will be chiefly to Dewey’s two
latest books, Human Nature and Conduct,and Reconstruction in
Philosophy,since these seem to provide all tnat is distinctive
1
in his earlier writings and represent, in addition, the most 
recent formulations of his philosophical thinking.
.. with tne exception of his Outline of Ethics (1391) which is Hegelian 
in point of view and evidently written before Dewey had come toform 
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SECTION 1.
P S Y C H O L O G Y «
Since our interest in Dewey‘s psychology is because of the 
light which it throws on the fundamental assumptions on which 
Dewey's ethical theory is based, we shall concern ourselves here 
with discussing only such of his psychological doctrines as seem 
to have this important bearing. The doctrines which we shall 
find to have such determining influence on his ethical theory 
seem in the last analysis to centre round his view regarding the 
knowing aspect of consciousness, whether this knowing be logical 
or moral, and it is therefore with his view regarding this aspect 
of consciousness uhat we shall primarily concern our selves in the 
sequel.
The psychology which Dewey adopts is frankly naturalistic.
It is, as he himself tells us, "wnat is now termed behaviourist 
1
psychology". He finds the need for "the development of a
2
psychology based upon biology" and this is what he seeks to 
supply in his view regarding human nature. Our thesis is that 
it is because of such naturalistic, biological, predilections, 
that Dewey fails to see that knowing in general - and moral 
knowing in particular, for that is our chief concern - is not a
secondary and derived, but a primary and ultimate aspect of
■human consciousness, and that also because of his biiblogicalSa /v^
predilections/
1. Essays in Experimental Logic, p.VI.
2. Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp.83 & 4.
2.
predilections he denies the capacity for immediate apprehension.
These two doctrines which, when applied to the realm of morals,
would seem to signify an overlooking of the moral attitude as
an ultimate characteristic of the human consciousness, and a
denial of the capacity for immediate apprehension of moral value,
fewe shall find, in the end, determine his entire ethical theory.A
It is these two doctrines regarding knowing in general together 
with the very inadequate account of the self which Dewey gives 
us and which we shall later find to underlie a certain inter­
pretation of his moral criterion, which will be the objects of 
our enquiry in the first part of this section under the heading, 
Knowing in general. The latter part of the section will be con- 
soerned wioh Dewey?s account of the moral consciousness, more 
especially with showing his failure - in line with his theory of 
knowing in general - to take account of the ultimate moral 
attitude and how this failure comes to prominence in his account 
of moral obligation.
1» Knowing in General.
The fundamental tenet in Dewey's psychology is expressed
by saying "that habits formed in process of exercising biological
aptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recollection, fore-
:sight and judgment: a mind or consciousness or soul in general
which performs these operations is a myth"^ and that knowing 1b
2an activity which has been hit upon accidentally in the process 
of/
1. Human Nature and Conduct, p.176.
2. " " " p. 18b.
3
of biological adaptation to environment. The questions which 
such a dictum at once raises are whetner knowing can be adeq­
uately interpreted in terms of anything not itself and whether 
there is any need for postulating a self which is active a»eb in 
knowing.
Dewey's position in this regard manifestly arises from his
avowed .desire to base psychology on biology. He himself
attributes all that is distinctive in his psychology to this
attempt to interpret the facts of human life from tne biological 
1
point of view. When tnus interpreted,he finds that " inter­
action of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation 
which secures utilisation of the latter, is tne primary fact, the 
basic category. Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, 
secondary in origin ... (and) involved in the process by which 
life is sustained and evolved. The senses lose their place as
gateways of knowing to take tneir rightful place as stimuli to 
2
action". The biological point of view, then, pervades his 
psychology and leads him to such conclusions as tne foregoing, 
which we must now discuss.
If knowing is thus "secondary in origin," it would appear 
that it must be derived from something other than itself. 
Accordingly Dewey tells us that knowing is derived from "the
3
workings of natural impulses in connection with environment." 
What/
ip. Human Nature and Conduct, pp.83 - 87.
Leconstruction in Phil. p.87. 
tuman Nature and Conduct, p. 187.
What is meant by this seems to be that "we know at such times
as (when) habits are impeded when a conflict is set up in which
1
impulse is released," that is, that knowing arises as a sequence 
of impeded impulse in the process of biological adaptation to 
environment. While this may be true, it surely cannot be re­
garded as giving us the right to regard knowing as derived from 
impulse. All that it seems capable of vouching for seems to be 
th^t knowing follows impeded impulse, but to conclude from this 
that knowing is derived from impulse would seem to be to fall 
into the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. But 
beyond such an account of the seoondariness of knowing, Dewey 
seems to give no other. Further, when it is seen that no amount 
of effort is able when impulse is altogether non-cognitive, to 
produce knowledge, it would seem that knowing cannot be regarded 
as derivable from impulse. Thus when impulse is regarded as 
wholly non-cognitive it would seem to belp, mere unconscious urge, 
not unlike motion in a billiard ball, or movement in what psy­
chologists are wont po call, reflex action, and how knowledge can 
be derived from it is not what one can easily see. But if 
impulse from which knowing is sougut to be derived is itself re- 
:garded as including a cognitive element, or a certain amount of 
awareness, in it, - and this is possibly what Dewey assumes 
throughout his argument without being aware of it - then, it would 
seem very like a confession from him that knowing is not derived 
from/
Human Nature etc. p.183.
D
from feta anything not itself , but is an underived and ultimate 
aspect of consciousness, in as much as it is found to exist even 
in tne most elementary psychological data that he is willing to 
recognise.
A similar conclusion would seem to follow if instead of
starting with impulse, we start with sensations as our primary
data. - We noticed that Dewey regarded sensations as non-cognitive.
If by this is meant that the function of sensations is essentially
practical and biological, we may readily agree with him that this
is indeed even as he tells us, but to go furtner and to assert
1
that sensations "are not ways of knowing at all", that a sensation
2
is "urgent not cognitive in quality", is to fail to see that while 
sensations perform a very important function in aiding biological 
adaptation to environment, they seam also to be "ways of knowing", 
however imperfect they may be in this capacity. To deny some 
kind of awareness as primitively included in sensation is surely 
to go against facts. Is it not true, for example, that in sensing 
red, I not only experience certain mental processes which suggest 
to me a certain respsonse, but am also aware of red as a given 
object? How then are we to agree with Dewey in thinking that 
sensations are wholly non-cognitlve* In fact, it would seem tnat 
if sensations did not include an element of awareness in them, they 
cannot even function as stimuli which bring about a response from 
the individual (ifl by response is meant, as it eaeudl should be 
meant/
1. Reconstruction in Phil. p.90.
2. " “ p.87.
6
meant, conscious action), for ex hypotnesi they would be uncon- 
iscious, and the action resulting from them so similar to tne 
action and reaction of bodies in the realm of Pnysics, that phey 
would hardly be capable of accounting for the conscious, respons­
ive action that we find in the realm of biology and that Dewey 
regards them as bringing about. If so, it would appear that 
awareness must be regarded as forming an essential part of 
sensation, as we knew it in man, and this is the same as saying 
that since the knowing aspect of consciousness is found once more 
to characterise even the most primitive psychological data that 
we are able to reach, ip must be regarded as an underived and 
ultimate aspect of human consciousness.
The reason for Dewey-s refusing to regard knowing as a 
primary aspect of human consciousness seems to be that hel^s 
so imbued with the biological point of view, according to which 
overt acpion is the basic category that he fails to do justice 
to Phe knowing aspect of human consciousness. This fact^ comes 
to even greater prominence when we pass on to consider his view 
with regard to immediate knowing. We have already seen how 
Dewey failed to see that in sensation there is an element of 
knowing. This failure seems to lead him to deny the capacity 
for immediate apprehension. Immediate knowing comes to be in­
terpreted by him wholly in terms of "behaviour", and on this 
hypothesis objects are regarded as experienced in immediate
1
apprehension as merely stimuli to needed changes in operation
• *
or/
leconstruction in Phil. p.89.
or as "signals to redirections ofaction" ( and as therefore not 
really apprehended. There seems, indeed, to he mucn truth in 
Dewey's contention as will he seen from the fact that as a rule 
in pursuing a course of activity we hardly ever think of the 
nature of the objects which we may use, hut only regard them 
in their capacity to meet our purposes. A chair, for example, 
may often he for us not much more than a "signal" far the sitting 
activity. We hardly, under ordinary circumstances, tnink of tne 
wood out of which the chair is made. But while this is so, such 
a view of the matter seems inadequate in that in sense-perception 
there seems to he not only an apprehension of meaning for activity,
Ihut also an apprehension of fact. In perceiving a chair, al- 
: though I may think only of its meaning as a thing to lsit on, I 
seem also to apprehend the chair as a given object, however vague 
this apprehension may he. To regard the chair as it appears in 
immediate apprehension as apprehended as a mere "signal" or "symbol" 
is on this account essentially misleading, for the symbol-element 
in our perception of tne chair is not, as we have seen, by any 
means the whole of that perception. Dewey, however, because of 
his biological predilections seemsjso engrossed in the symbol- 
element in perception tnat he overlooks the fact-element in it 
and in the end comes to deny it. The falsity of such a procedure 
seems to become even more flagrant when it is seen that often we 
immediately apprehend objects which have no relevant relation 
wnatever to the activity we are pursuing, either in the way of 
furthering/
1
Reconstruction in Phil. p.88.
8
furthering or hindering it. Thus on taking a walk, I may see 
stones, people, houses, trees and birds, wnich under ordinary 
circumstances may not present themselves as Bymbols for action 
at all. They seem to present themselves for what tney are quite 
independent of my purposes or behaviour, and therefore not as 
"signals to redirection of action". In their case the element 
of fact seems much more predominant in consciousness than the 
element of meaning. De^ey, however, completely overlooks s&efe 
such immediate apprehension of objects, apprehension signifying
for him, because of his"behaviourism," something wholly purposive
*  iv€,and never contemplated. But this, as we have been trying to 
show, seems quite unwarranted by the facts as brought to light 
in sense perception. Further such a view, with regard to immed- 
:iate apprehension is destructive of all knowledge, for if the 
knowledge that becomes possible for us in immediate apprehension, 
be denied, then it is evident tnat we can have nothing on which 
to construct the mediate knowledge of which Dewey speaks. The 
scepticism and subjectivism which as we shall see characterise 
Dewey's Logic and Ethics seem thus to be traceable to this one 
psycholo&ical doctrine of his which denies the capacity for 
immediate apprehension. Knowledge, whether of facts, or of 
values, becomes on tnis hypothesis impossible with the result that 
truth and goodness come to be interpreted in wholly subjective 
terms. But all this is in anticipation, it being necessary here 
only to note that Dewey because of his "biologism", denies the 
capacity for immediate apprehension, wnich, however, appears to 
be/
9
be an ultimate characteristic of the human consciousness, as 
ultimate indeed as "behaviour“ itself into terms of which he 
seeks to reduce it.
The reason why Dewey does not wish to acknowledge knowing, 
and immediate knowing in particular, as an ultimate aspect of 
human consciousness seems to be not only because of his"biologism,! , 
to whicn we have referred above(but also because of his naturalism 
which is unable to explain except as below in terms of behaviour 
the analysis and synthesis which seems to characterise the kncw- 
iing aspect of consciousness. He tells us, "it is ... almost 
a truism uhat knowledge is both synthetic and analytic,... a set 
of discriminated elements connected by relations. This combin- 
sation of opposite factors of unity and difference, elements and 
relations, has been a standing paradox and mystery of the theory 
of knowledge. It will remain so until we connect tne theory of 
knowledge with an empirically verifiable theory of behaviour, ...
We know at such times as habits are impeded, wnen a conflict is 
set upjin which impulse is released. So far as this impulse sets 
up a definite forward tendency it constitutes the forward, pros­
pective character of knowledge. In this phase unity or synthesis 
if found. We are striving to unify our responses to achieve a 
consistent environment wnich will restore unity of conduct. ...
But what we know the objects that present themselves with definite­
ness and assurance are retrospective. ... They are elements dis­
criminated, analytic just because old habits so far as they are
checked are also broken into objects wnich define the obstruction
of
/
of ongoing a c t i v i t y .  ... Unityis sometning sought; split, divis-
1
ion is something given, at hand."
Although this may be an accurate description of the mental 
processes involved in striving to overcome a conflict which is 
perceived in the way of a successful pursuing of one:s activity, 
it seems altogether to fail to touch the problem of analysis and
synthesis in immediate apprehension, as we know it in Logic.
(A-The question is, whether all knowing, whether mediate^immediate, 
does not involve complex processes of analysis and synthesis, and 
to seek to answer this question by comparing logical analysis with 
the "division" given in a situation of conflict, and logical
UrinXXt-
synthesis with "unity sought" in the same situation seems quite 
capable of being interpreted to apply to mediate knowledge, not
capable of being applied to immediate knowledge at all. It is
perhaps understandable that Dewey’s account of analysis and syn- 
:thesis should apply only to mediate knowledge for on his hypothesis, 
as we saw, there was no such thing as immediate knowledge; but
our objection is not that he does not deal with a problem whicn
does not exist for him but that just because the problem does not 
exist for him, his account of the matter fails to touch the question 
which is so fundamental, namely, that even in apprehension of the 
most immediate kind, there are involved, as Kant has shown, pro­
cesses of analysis and synthesis. The question is whether in 
perceiving anything, whether it be "given division" or "unity 
sought" there are not involved complex processes of analysis and 
synthesis./ 
luman Nature and Conduct, pp.183 & 4.
synthesis. Dewey however does not face this question with the
result, as we snail see, that he fail» to give us an adequate
account of the knowing self.
If knowing i3 thus characterised by processes of analysis
and synthesis throughout all its manifestations it would appear,
as Kant pointed out, that nothing can adequately account for it,
except a' knowing self. Dewey, however, refuses to postulate a
self which is active in knowing. For him the self is but "a
system of beliefs, desires and purposeswhich are formed in the
1
interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment“ .
2
He speaks of tne self as but "the bearer or carrier of experience".
The chief objection that Dewey brings forward against the self as
more than a mere "bearer of experience" is that such a view with
regard to it "implies first the severance of man from nature and
3
then of each man from his fellows". But it hardly seems possible
to regard thi3 as what -chose who believe in a self in this manner
hkare logically comitted to. On the other hand, it would seem that
it must be regarded by all that a self, as we know it, cannot exist
as a self apart from a physical and social envtronment. Dewey's
arguments, therefore, against the idea of a “separate and indep-
3 ' 4
sendent consciousness", a "separate psvchic realm", an "original
4
individual consciousness", though quite legitimate, seem to be 
urged against a view which hardly anyone can be found to hold.
Dewey’s/
Human Nature etc. preface. 
" " “ p.292.
12.
Dewey*g real reason for denying the self as an active principle
expressing itself in all its mental life seems to be that on the
naturalistic basis on which he seeks to build^ his psychology
there seems no necessity for, and perhaps no possibility of,
postulating such a self. We have already seen how Dewey failed
to see the processes of analysis and synthesis which seem to be
involved in immediate apprehension, and in line with this he
holds that "habits do all the perceiving recognising, imagining,^7
1
recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done", and
since "habits" seem to mean for Dewey dispositions formed by trie
constant working on us of the physical and "social context",
habits seem to work mechanically on the appearance of the approp-
2
:riate stimulus without the need cf a self. This seems indeed
to find support in the biological realm, to which, as we have
seen, Dewey likes to go for his views on psychology. In tne
biological realm, it would seem that there is evidence for what
Scholastic philosophers were wont to call "sensuous memory", a
good illustration of which we may borrow from Stout. "A dog
which has been whipped will whine and display signs of fear and
distress at the sight of the lash! The original pain-sensations
produced a diffuse nervous excitement, whichjgave rise to a general
disturbance oB organic functions and to organic sensations. The
sight of the whip revives an analagous nervous and bodily excite-
3
:ment and witn it analagous experiences." Whether the dog can 
rightly/
1. Human Nature etc. p.177.
. " “ p.138.
Stout, G.F. Manual of Psychology, 3rd Ed. p.38y.
rightly be said to remember being whipped or not;the mere eight
of the whip seems to be sufficient to stir up experiences sim-
:ilar to the one with whicn the lash was originally connected. In
Such a case perhaps we may agree witn Dewey that "knowledge ... —
1
lives in tne muscles, not in consciousness" - at least so it 
seems to all outward appearances. But to seek to reduce all
knowledge to terms of such more or less mechanical response pro-
rsceeding from the museei muscles to frequently occuring stimuliA
seems,while consistent enough with Dewey’s professed naturalism 
and "biologism" to do great injustice to tne mental activity which 
seems obviously to be involved in tne higher forms of knowledge. 
Thus in recognition, for example, which forms an essential aspect 
of tne knowing activity, we seem to have more than a mere repro­
duction of mental statesj there being in addition to the exper­
iencing of mental states, similar to previous ones - which is all 
that we found to be given in the case of the dog when it "recog- 
inises" the whip - an identification of tnis similarity. The 
circumstances that a nerve-current passing through a system of 
nerve-fibres may leave there physiological "vestiges" wnich make 
it easier for a similar nerve current occurring later to traverse 
the same path, seems in no way to indicate how tnis second nerve- 
current or its accompanying mental state is to recognise itself as 
resembling the first. If the dog of Stout*s Illustration showed 
signs of fear and distress at the sight of the lash as such, with 
no recognition of the lash as wnat was the cause of painful ex­
periences/
Human Nature etc. p.177.
14.
:periencee in the past, then we cannot, it would seem credit the 
dog witn memory - if by this is meant not retentiveness in general 
but the capacity to recall ideally past experiences and to identify 
them as such. Whether the lower animals can be credited with 
such memory or not,it seems certain tnat trie two kinds of memory 
are quite distinct; for wnile one is, if we may so put it, wholly 
unconscious, the other is conscious of itself. It is the con-
biological predilections, tnat seems to underlie Dewey's assertion 
that "knowledge ... lives in the muscles not in consciousness", and 
prevents him from seeing tne necessity of tne self as an active 
principle in all human experience. Further wnen it is noted that 
the simplest act of judgment and one briefest process of reason­
ing would seem to be impossible if an abiding selff as distinguished 
from its changing states, were not capable of passing from subject 
to predicate and from premise to conclusion, and of viewing them 
as mutually related to each other, still more would the complicated 
processes of reasoning which seem to characterise the higher forms 
of knowledge appear to be impossible apart from a self, which is 
not merely a "bearer or carrier of experience" or a mere sum of 
its mental states systematised and viewed as a wnole;but an active 
principle which works in and through the manifold diversity which 
characterises its life.
How this failure to regard the self as an active principle 
underlying all its activities affects his ethical theory will 
appear later. here it is only necessary to state that it would 
seem to prevent Dewey from seeing the complexity which character­
ises/
fusion with the latter, owing to naturalistic and
15
:ises man’s conscious life, and accordingly unduly to simplify 
the processes which s6em to be involved in tne moral life. How 
Dewey comes to view the self in uhis manner is clear. His nat­
uralistic biological psychology, as we saw, prevented him from 
seeing the complex active processes that seem to be involved in 
all knowing, whether mediate or immediate, and this quite con­
sistently enough leads him to deny the self as an active prin-
I f  1 «
sciple and to regard it as a mere bearer of experience.
2. Moral Consciousness♦
Till now we have been concerned only with knowledge in 
generalj but this, as Dewey tells us, "is of far-reaching im­
portance for everything concerned with moral beliefs, conscience
1
and judgments of right and wrong." ITust as knowing is for Dewey
a product of habit and impulse,so it would seem is the moral
attitude. Thus he tells us "if it is recognised that knowing is
carried on Lnrough the medium of natural factors, the assumption
of special agencies for moral knowing becomes outlawed and in-
scredible". Moral knowing, like knowing in general, becomes an
\ 2"acquirement", a "bi-product". Having been hit upon accidentally, 
as it were, and tne product being liked and its importance noted, 
it becomes upon occasion, a definite occupation, "and education 
confirms the disposition, as it may confirm that of a musician or 
carpenter or tennis player. But tnere is no more an original
4
separate/
1. Human Nature etc. p.184.
2. !I « p.185.
separate impulse or power in one case than in the other"«
Since Dewey's view here regarding the derivedness of moral know­
ing is, as he himself tells us, but a corollary from his view 
regarding the derivedness of knowing in general, it would seem 
to labour under the difficulties pointed out in connection with 
that view.
This failure to take account of the moral attitude as an 
ultimate characteristic of the human consciousness comes to per­
vert his view of conscience or moral knowing. Conscience or 
moral knowing comes therefore to be viewed by him as concerned, 
in the end, with discovering what acts tend to produce the most
agreeable consequences, as these are determined for us by our
2 X
social environment. In defining conscience, he says, "When a 
child acts, those about him react. They shower encouragement upon 
him, visit him with approval, or they bestow frowns and rebukes. 
What others do to us when we act is as natural a consequence of 
our action as what the fire does to us when we plunge our hands 
in it... In language and imagination we rehearse the responses 
of others just as we dramatically enact other consequences."3 
And in discussing moral ends, he telle us, "They (moral ends) 
arise out of natural effects or consequences which in the begin­
ning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any purpose is concern­
ed. Men like some of the consequences and dislike others. Hence­
forth (or, till attraction and repulsion alter) attaining or 
averting/
Human Nature etc. p.186.
cp. " “ pp. 225f., p.206, and pp.314-15.
" " pp.314&l5.
I * ,
averting similar consequences are aims or ends* These consequen­
ces constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes
1
under deliberation.“ Moral judgments, then, would on this hypo­
thesis imply a certain amount of experience, and observation of 
the effects of our acts, especially their effects upon others and 
a classification of these acts according as they produced agree­
able or disagreeable consequences. Even admitting all this with 
the proviso that much of this work, if it occurs, must be regard­
ed as taking place unconsciously, it would seem that such a view 
with regard to the psychological antecedents of moral judgment
fails in one important particular. It fails to distinguish between
6
a judgment which asserts that an act has agreeable consequences 
and a judgment which asserts that an act has moral value. That 
these two judgments are psychologically distinct there can, It 
would seem, be little doubt. When I judge for instance that an act 
such as the partaking of a sumptuous meal has agreeable consequen­
ces, I need not at all be thinking of the act as morally good or 
bad. On the other hand, it would seem that in order to decide 
whether the partaking of such a meal is morally good or bad, I 
must the approach the question from an entirely different point of 
view and ask, whether in spite of being agreeable, the partaking 
of a sumptuous meal is morally right at a time, let us say, when 
many of my neighbours are dying of starvation. The two judgments 
therfore appear to be psychologically distinct, the moral judgment
A
being/
Human Nature etc. p.225#
being conditioned by the moral point of view, while the judgment 
regarding what it is that will produce agreeable consequences is 
not so conditioned. The ultimate moral attitiude,which seems thUB 
to come to the foreground as what in the end distinguishes moral 
judgments from judgments regarding what produces the most agrue- 
able consequencesfwould seem then to be what is most characterist­
ic of moral knowing. And yet Dewey’s view which seems to regard s 
moral knowing as concerned with discovering what produces the 
most agreeable consequences, appears to be based on a failure to 
note tnis fundamental fact- this failure being no doubt, in the 
last analysis, due to the reason that on the non-moral biological 
level to which Dewey likes to go for his interpretation of mofcal 
phenomena, the ultimate moral attitude which we have found to 
underlie moral knowing is not vouched for.
Dewey's failure to take account of the ultimate moral attit­
ude appears to come to even greater prominence in his account of 
moral obligation. This is after all the touchstone by which all 
psychological theories of the moral consciousness would seem to be 
required to be tested, for as Kant has shown, the sense of ought 
seems to be what is most characteristic of that consciousness.
Dwwey regards the sense of moral obligation as "the work wrought-
1
in us by the social environment." In discussing the authority 
of Right, he says, "we live in a world where others live too. Our 
acts affect them. They perceive these effects, and react upon us 
in consequence. Because they are living beings they make demands 
upon/
ttuman Nature etc., p.316.
19. '
1» Human 2 . "
upon us for certain tilings from us. They approve and condemn- not 
in abstract theory but in what they do to us. The answer to the 
question ’Why not put your hand in the fire?1 is the answer of 
fact. If you do, your hand will be burnt. The answer to the quest­
ion why acknowledge the right is of the same sort. For Right is 
only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in act­
ion which others impress upon us, and of wnich we are obliged, if
we would live, to take some account. Its authority is the exigency
2
of thei£ demands, the efficacy of their insistencies." "{The
right) signifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon
2
us to induce us to think and desire in certain ways.” Moral ob­
ligation, then, comes to be identified, on Dewey's theory, with 
the sense of being under social compulsion. Whether the two attit­
udes can be thus identified is what we must consider.. If they can 
be identified, it would seem, that Dewey is right in not taking 
account of the moral attitude; for when they are thus identified, 
it would appear that the moral attitudefwhich seems so inextricably 
bound up with the sense of moral obligation,.is but an indirect ex­
pression of the desire to secure agreeable consequences on the 
part of one living under social compulsion, and therefore not an 
ultimate and underived characteristic of the moral consciousness 
as we have taken it to be. The question therefore whetner the 
sense of moral obligation can be identified w i t h  the sense of 
social compulsion would seem to be of prime importance for our 
discussion/
Natureetc.p. 326.
" ' p. 327.
20.
discussion.
That historically the two attitudes- viz., that produced
by the sense of moral obligation and that produced by the sense
of nroiraik social compulsion- have been found intimately associated
with each other, ther* are can be no doubt, that in certain stages
of morality what was socially required was identical in content
uwith what was felt to morally obligatory seems to be fairly wellA
established, but that therefore the attitude whicn is produced by
the sense of moral obligation is identical with the attitude
which is produced by the sense of social compulsion, does not
seem to follow. The one, on th^'other hand, seems to be quite
distinct from the other, as is easily from the fact that the two
A
attitudes may and often do come into violent conflict with each 
other, as seems fully borne witness to in the experience of 
individuals and races that have reached what has been called the 
reflective stage in morality. That principles which thus oppose 
each other cannot rightly be equated witn each other would seem 
to be an elementary truth.
That the attitude produced by thefsense of moral obligation 
is distinct from that produced by tne sense of social compulsion 
is further confirmed by the fact of moral progress, for moral 
progress would seem to be impossible so long as the two coincided. 
Moral progress seems to demand as its fundamental requisite that 
moral obligation should attach itself to more than what is re­
quired by society, b#t on Dewey's hypothesis it would appear that 
moral obligation cannot do anything of the kind, for ex hypothesi 
moral obligation is regarded as identical with social compulsion. 
Dewey's/
Dewey's theory, then, in so far as it identifies moral obligation 
witn social compulsion would be seen to be contradicted by the 
fact of moral progress.
Further, that the two attitudes are psychologically quite 
distinct is seen by analysing the two attitudes themselves. With­
out attempting to be exhaustive in our analysis, it would appear 
that the sense of moral obligation is constituted by a conscious­
ness of moral good on the one side, and a consciousness that tnis
/good is binding on the self, on the other> the coercion perceived 
being that of the moral good itselfj wl^ile the sense of social 
compulsion would seem to be constituted by a consciousness of 
what is required by society and a consciousness of this as bind­
ing on tne self, the coercion here being perceived not as that of 
the moral good, but as that of the society which demands the 
particular act. In the case of tne sense of moral obligation, 
then, it would seem that there need be no consciousness at all of 
social compulsion, and in the case of the sense of social compuls­
ion that there need be no consciousness at all of moral good. A 
sharper distinction can hardly be desired.
In accordance with what in each case is regarded as author­
itative, there appears a further distinction. The authority of the 
good is felt to be not only imposed by one:s own best judgment, 
but as absolutely binding, while the authority of social compulsion 
(apart from the sense of tne moral good) is felt to be external 




attitude seems to be the attitude of the man wno is able to say 
that the service of the Good is perfect freedom, while the second 
seems to be tne attitude of the slave who feels himself bound to 
serve a tyrant from wnom he is unable to flee. So great appears 
to be the difference in attitude according to what is in each case 
regarded as authoritative that it hardly seems possible to regard 
the man who does the Good, merely because he is required by socie­
ty, as at all moral, much less to reduce the one altitude to terms 
of the other.
Not only do the two attitudes seem to be quite distinct 
when viewed psychologically, butjit seems that we are unable as a 
matter of fact to derive moral obligation from social compulsion 
as the theory demands. Tnis is only to be expected, for if tne two 
altitudes are psychologically distinct, no amount of manipulating 
the one can, it would seem, reduce it to the other. If a person 
can be found wno had no sense of moral obligation, it would seem 
that while social compulsion can force him to do certain things 
which are good, it can never get him to feel tnat he ought to do 
those things. He will feel tnat he must do them, if he is to es­
cape punishment or attain reward, bui|not, it would seem, that he 
ought to do utiem. To pass from tne ipust to the ought would seem 
to require that he should regard what he must do, not only as 
what he is compelled to do by society, but also as itself morally 
good. Without this moral attitude, then, it would appear tnat 
there/
there is no way of his regarding what society enjoin^s as 
morally obligatory. The same point may also be expressed by 
saying that though obligation may be brought home to one by 
force, force cannot create obligation. Such theories as Dewey's 
which seek to drive moral obligation from social compulsion seem 
really to take for granted throughout their argument the fact 
of obligation, and only to show the historical process by which 
its fuller recognition is brought about; but this is surely an 
illegitimate procedure on their hypothesis, for it is to take 
for granted the very thing they are trying to deny. If, however, 
it were not taken for granted, it would seem from the fact that 
no amount of social compulsion is, as we have seen, able to create 
moral obligation, that Dewey’s theory cannot account for moral 
obligation at all. We may therefore confront Dewey with a
vndllema, either to accept moral obligation as an? ultimate and
ft
underived characteristic of the moral consciflMtfiousness, in 
which case he must renounce his naturalism, and accept the moral 
attitude as an ultimate aspect of the moral consciousness, or to 
deny the fact of moral obligation in which case he will be 
denying what is most characteristic of that consciousness.
The inability to do Justice to what is most characteristic 
of the moral consciousness, namely, the sense of moral obligation, 
seems to be.as we noted but the result of his failure (to whicht i




which seems to distinguish that consciousness and with which the 
sense of moral obligation seems so inextriably bound up. This 
failure to note the ultimate moral attitude coupled with his 
denial of the capacity for immediate apprehensionfand rejection 
of the self as an active principle underlying all experience, all 
of which we have found to be involved in his view with regard to 
knowing in general, we shall find in the end to be responsible 
for much of his view in Ethics.
In the meantime, we may conclude by pointing out that the
chief defect in Dewey's psychology seems to arise from the
naturalistic, biological setting into which Dewey likes to fit
the facts of human consciousness. While the biological approach
to the study of human nature may in itself be praiseworthy it
seems to lead us astray when it is regarded as providing the
framework into which all of the facts of human consciousnes must
1 .
fit. On this hypothesis, as Dewey himself tells us, interaction 
of organism and environment, resulting in adaptation becomes the 
primary fact, the basic category. Knowing is relegated to a 
derived position, secondary in origin, immediate apprehension is 
denied altogether to be a way of knowing, with disastrous 
consequences as we shall sfcc for his Logic and Ethics, the 
activity of the mind which is implied in all knowing is overlooked, 
with the result that the self cornea to be denied, or if affirmed, 
to be regarded as a mere system of beliefs and purposes. In 
line/
Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 87.
line with all this, thejjultimate moral attitude which seems to 
he presupposed in moral knowing is overlooked, and the oapacity 
for immediate apprehension - more especially capacity for 
immediate apprehension of moral value as we shall see later - 
is denied and what is left would seem to he so wholly on the 
non-moral biological level, that it must not surprise us if 
Dewey's naturalism and "Biologism" combines to prevent him from 
giving us an adequate system of Etnics.
25.
SECTION II.
L O G I C -
In our preface, we stated that, Dewey's biological
l'
psyohology led him to a nominalistic logic, which may be
found to determine his views in etnics. The nominalism which
thus seems to prevade his Ethios will, of course, not come to
our notice till we reach our ethical section. All that we
propose to do here is merely to discuss the bases of this
nominalism as we gather them from a critical study of his
logical theory of universale or concepts, for it would seem
that once Dewey's nominalism in its logical form is questioned,
such of his views in Ethics as are based on this nominalism will
in so far be questionable.
A few words will be added, at the end of thi3 section,
on Dewey's view of Truth or Logical Validity, for according to
him, his view regarding moral validity gains support, to say
2the least, from his view regarding logical validity.
1. Unlversals or Concents.
We may point out, to start with, the biological setting 
in which Dewey's theory of concepts appears. Thus he tells us 
that/
1. We have hazarded the statement that Dewey's nominalism is the result 
of his biological psychology. The truth of this statement will appear 
in the course of this section.
2. cp. Reconstruction in philosophy p. 172. "Experimental logic when 
carried into morals makes every quality that is judged to be good 
according as it contributes to amelioration of existing ills" .
that "thought or Intelligence is the means of intentional 
reconstruction of experience"'!' He never tires of asserting 
that thinking is never otiose, but always arises in a situation 
of conflict, and has a special function to perform, namely, to
pcontrive means of getting over the conflict.* "Knowing", on 
this view “ceases to be comtemplativ* and becomes practical",3 
"the interaction of organism and environment, resulting in 
some adaptation whichpeoures utilisation of the latter, i3 the 
primary fact, the basic categatory"4 * it is necessary to note 
this biological setting for, as we shall see, it lays bare the 
fundamental assumptions on which Dewey’s theory of Concepts i& 
based.
Chief among the doctrines to which such a biological 
point of view in Psychology leads him, we noticed, was one that 
declared that immediate apprehension yields no knowledge but 
only “stimuli to behaviour". Once this is granted, it will 
seem that Dewey's view regarding concepts will follow as a 
matter of course, for on tnis view, as we shall see, Concepts 
are not true of the real world, but are only a set of devices 
which will aid one in behaviour, i.e. in adaptation to 
environment. It is easily seen how this follows necessarily 
from the denial of immediate apprehension as yielding knowledge, 
for if immediate apprehension does not y&ild knowledge, and 
since for Dewey Concepts are not the revelations of some 
"super-empirical reason",b but are the products of experience,
Reconstruction in Philosophy p. 134.
Essays in Experimental Logic pp. 9-12
Reconstruction in Philosophy p. 116 * n " p . 87
*• n it p. 90
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it would seem that concepts must in the end he generalisations 
from immediate apprehension;1 -hut since immediate apprehension 
is assumed to give no knowledge of the real, what is a 
generalisation from immediate apprehension cannot, it would seem, 
reveal anything constitutive of the real world. The biological 
point of view,.then, which as we saw in our psychological section, 
completely overlooked the fact of immediate knowledge, and in 
the end denied it, seems to he what contributes to Dewey s
t h e o r y  of C o n c e p t s .
In a similar manner, again because of certain biological
assumptions which will presently disclose themselves, Dewey 
finds that Concepts are not fixed forms, nor classes, but are 
only artificial lines of division invented by us, as being 
convanient for our purposes at the moment, and giving place to 
others when other purposes arise. Thus, he tells us, a basis 
is furnished for selecting and organising things according as 
their ways of acting are related to carryforward porsuit.
Cherry trees will be differently grouped by wood-workers, 
orchardists, artiste, scientist, and merry-makers. To the 
execution of different purposes, different ways of acting and 
reacting on the part of trees are important. Each classification 
may be equally Bound when the difference of ends is borne in 
mind“1 • "Things have to be sorted out and arranged so that 
their grouping will promote successful action for ends. Con­
venience, economy and efficiency are the bases of classification."
The/
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The rôle which Dewey thus comes to ascribe to purpose 
in the formation of Concepts seems to be one of the chief out- 
comes of his "behaviourism". He emphasis the teleologicalA
character of classifications. He tells us that things are
classed together in spite of their endless diversity "in view
of common relationship to an end"l He would have us believe
is
that purpose is in the end what wa® responsible for Concepts.A
While much of this may undoubtedly be true, the only point of
controversy is whether purpose can be regarded as so wholly
creative of concepts that it can be regarded as the ultimate test
of concepts. On this point Dewey expresses himself without
ambiguity. He speaks of the "objective standard" by which
classifications are to be tested as indeed the purpose for wnich
they are made^ and apparently recognises no other objective
criterion by which they are to be tested than the need for sorting
out and g r o u p i n g  things b o  that the y  w i l l  p r o m o t e  succ e s s f u l
2action for ends,
In criticism we may point out that however true it may be 
that, as Dewey tells us, "one (classifcation) will further the 
cabinetmaker in reaching his end while another will hamper him.
CTKOne classification will assist the botanist in carrying fruitfullyA ghis work of enquiry, and another will retard and confuse him", 
it seems certain that if the classifications of the cabinetmaker 
and the botanist were not based on universal characteristics 
existing/
1« Reconstruction in Philosophy p. 153.
2- " " p. 154
S. " " " pp.153-4
existing in the objects that they dealt with, then not all the 
purposes in the world can create these universal characteristics 
in the respective objects. For this reason, it would appear, 
that our purposes can be rightly regarded as determining only our 
apprehension of the common elements in things but that unless these
common elements existed in things, they could never be found -
Umuch less made use of for our purposes. But to admit what seems 
such a common place matter will seem to involve some serious 
changes in Dewey’s theory. It will prevent him from regarding 
purpose as providing the objective criterion of Concepts, for 
now it will seem that the objective test of a Concept is not the 
wholly subjective one afforded by purpose or need, but the outer 
world of things and persons. It appears, then, that Dewey's view 
with regard to concepts is brought about by his "biologism" which 
has so exaggerated the r6le of purpose in relation to Concepts 
that purpose for action comes to be regarded as the objective test 
of Concepts.
Another determining factor with regard to concepts would
toseem to be, according tfee Dewey, the principle of ecenomy or 
oonva&ience, Thus, as we saw, Dewey tells "us that "convenience, 
economy and efficiency are the bases of classification". In this 
view once again his desire to interpret the facts of mental life 
in biological terms of utility to action seems to come to the 
surface. But even considered apart from such a desire, Dewey's 




as he does that "Every concrete experience íh its totality is 
unique, ... is itself non-reduplicable"} there seems t»o otner way 
of explaining how language with its meanings has come to be at 
all. If things have nothing in common, then a Concept cannot, 
it would seem, be more than a name for calling up all the unique 
particulars for which it stands, but if asked how do such names 
come to exist at all if they stood for nothing real, the only 
available answer seems to be that tt was convenient to group 
things in classes under common names, even though these things 
were severally unique. It was economical, it saved fatigue, in
pshort, it was biologically useful. That put this, the view 
seems very plausible there can be no doubt; but its plausibility 
seems to be gained altogether by identifying the concept with the 
word - view which we will examine later. Meamrhile, regarding 
the principle of Thought-economy, on which Dewey depends so 
largely for support, the principle itself even if valid, cannot 
it would seem prove anything, for it seems to be capable of 
being interpretted as favourable to Dewey's view of universals as 
well as to a view which holds that universals exist in particulars. 
Just as concepts are invented on Dewey's view, for the sake of 
economising effort, so it may be held that words are invented for 
the sake of economising effort in identifying the universal 
elements in the particular items of experience. Thus it would 
seem that the principle Thought-ocenomy can be pressed into the 
service of almost any view we wish. Further, the critieisms which 
we/
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we have urged against regarding purpose as the objective test 
of concepts will seem to apply equally here, for it is evident 
that while the need for economy may lead us to look for 
similarities in things by which we may classify them, it cannot 
create these similarities. Here again it appears that Dewey 
has got hold of a truth and exaggerated it till it has become 
a falsehood.
In line with the idea that concepts exist for the
sake of economy is the idea that they are inventions,1 products
of art.1 Without going into the question yet of whether concepts
can be regarded as inventions, we may enquire how far all
concepts can be regarded as a work of art, and whether this
makes them any the less real. Thus we are told "not all
qualities are equally fitted to be meanings of a wide efficiency,
and it is^work of art to select the proper qualities for doing
the work. This corresponds to the working over of raw material
tin.
into an effective tool. ... the more delicate and complicated^work 
which it has to do, the more art intervenes1*.^ That the means 
whereby we come to perceive the universal elements in things may 
be very elaborate is fairly well borne witness to by the complicated 
contrivances which science adopts for this purpose; but that all 
cases of grasping the universal pre-suppose such conscious art 
seems questionable. Some concepts such as that of substance, 
identity and difference, eg., seem to be so staple and ultimate that 
it led some philosophers to regard such ulitmate concepts as 
innate/
• Reconstruction in Phil. p. 149
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oJU.
innate and given prior to a«r experience. Without going to
a
this length, it seems quite possible to hold that some concepts
like the ones mentioned above are so simple that the mind seems
bk&to have capacity of apprehending them immediately on 
presentation in the items of experience. To grasp such 
universale, it does not seem necessary to see and compare several 
members of the same class; on other hand, by such processes, 
it would appear that these concepts can never be arrived at, 
for things cannot be seen and compared unless they were already 
perceived to be things that were different and yet similar, but 
to perceive them so is already, it would seem, to employ these 
universale which it is sought to gain by complicated processes 
of observation and comparison. It is facts such as these that 
seem inconvenient to Dewey’s naturalistic psychology, but 
nothing is gained it would appear by overlooking them.
We have next to enquire whether if our arriving at 
concepts implies much art, they on on that account any the lessA
objective, i.e. whether the more abBtract the concept the less 
true it is of the real world. This leads us to consider what 
is accomplished in abstraction which Dewey considers to be the 
process by which concepts are reached. We are told that 
abstraction means that some phase of a concrete experience is 
s&ifeected for the sake of the aid it gives in grasping something 
else, but that this abstracted element taken by itself is "a 
mangled fragment, a poor substitute for the living whole from 
which it is extracted",^ and that "the more theoritical, the 
more abstract an abstraction, or the further away it is from
anything/
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anything experienced in its concreteness, the better fitted fee
it is to deal with anyone of the indefinite variety of things
1that may later present themselves” . Though it cannot be doubted
-i@n ethat tn abstract, as the very word implies, some elment of the
A A
concrete detail of actual sense perception is removed from its 
setting, it does not at all seem to follow from this that what 
is thus removed becomes on that account a "mutilated fragment” •
\That it is a fragment would seem to follow from the nature of 
abstraction, but that this fragment is mutilated would m«s**i YluA 
independent proof; but this Dewey does not give. He seems 
merely to assume that abstraction mutilates the real.
When however it is seen that the facts do not warrant 
sucn a view, it would appear that we must regard Dewey’s view 
in this connection as unacceptable. Redness for example may 
be a quality belonging to an apple, and in actual sense - 
perception it may be combined with several other qualities like 
largeness, roundness, softness, sweetness, etc., but at any one 
time the quality of redness may hold my attention, and I may 
consciously abstract tnis quality from all the other qualities 
of the apple, and view it as capable of belonging to a definite 
number of objects. In this process, though being thus abstracted 
from all the other qualities of the apple, the quality of redness 
may rightly be viewed as but a fragment of what was given in 
the original sense perception, it would appear that redness 
though thus abstracted remains redness - a quality of the apple 
and of all other red objects. How it becomes mulilated is not 
what/
34.
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v/hat one can see. It is possible that the view of the 
abstracted, quality as mutilated bases itself on the fact that 
while I think of the abstract quality of redness, I may imagine 
a shade of red which is different from that which I pefceived 
in the apple- But this surely is to confound the image^I 
think the universal redness with the universal itself which isi i
apprehended through the image. The image of redness may be 
mutilated in the sense that the image of redness which F may
o . .
employ at particular time may be the image of a redness
r%
different in shade from what I perceived in the apple; but the
universal, redness, which I apprehended in this manner s6eme
unaffected by the image which I employ in its apprehension
for this appears as the quality that is possessed in common by
all objects that are red, and therefore as a real and not a
mulitated element 4>f the apple and of all the other objects in 
&which it inhers. It is this confusion between image and
A
the universal which is apprehended through it that seems to JteouA, 
to the view that the concept is but a mutilated fragnent of the 
real. However, this is merely speculation oh our part for 
Dewey nowhere attempts to prove that abstraction mutilates the 
real - a point wnich he merely seems to assume.
Such a view with regard to abstraction necessarily 
leads to the view that coneepts^many of which are formed by 
processes of abstraction are inventions; or as Dewey is foyfcid 
of calling them, "tools” , for if they are mutilated and 
distorted, there seems no way of accounting for them, but to 
regard/
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regard them as ’’works of art, constructed for a purpose in doing 
the things which have to be done” 1 Thus Dewey tells u s ,  "a 
classification is not a bare transcript or duplicate of some 
finished and done-far arrangement, pre-existing in nature. It 
is rather a repertory of weapons for attack upon the future and 
the unknown. ' For success, the details of past knowledge must 
be reduced from bare facts to meanings, the fewer, simpler and 
more extensive the better. ... They must be arranged as not to 
overlap... In order that theremay be ease and economy of movement 
in dealing with the enormous diversity of occurences that present 
themselves, we must be able to move promptly and definitely from
•Cb g
one tool of attack” . ”to accomplish this effictively, toA
develop an order then, till they become economic tools (and 
tools upon tools) for making an unknown and uncertain situation 
into a known and certain one, is the recorded triumph of human 
intelligence”'*" While in this account of the function of 
conception there is much truth, Dewey has, it would seem, in 
regarding concepts as tools, fallen into the very error which he 
constantly repudiates, namely, of hypostatising meanings into 
essences or subsistences having some sort of mysterious being
»Zapart from qualitative things and changes. When concepts are
regarded as tools invented by us they seem to become entities
which exist neither in the outer world nor in the mind, but in
some^of a world midway between the two. That they cannot be
regarded/
Essays in Experimental Logic p. 57 
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regarded as constitutive of the outer world, is shown by the 
fact that they are regarded as but mutilated fragments of this 
world’, that they do not exist in the mind is shown by the fact 
that they are "tools” , "instruments” , which the mind makes use 
of in dealing with new problems. Where and how they exist 
becomes, then,-an insoluble problem. The view as a matter of 
fact seems to rest on a failure to distinguish between an 
analogical way of speaking and an actual description of facts. 
Concepts may rightly be compared to tools, for it is by means of 
them that we seem to be enabled to construct great dis-tanee of 
knowledge, and to plan complicated plans of action; but to 
forget that when we speak of concepts as in this sense tools, 
we are speaking metaphorically seems to be to commit the element 
ary blunder of allowing ourselves to be misled by a metaphor, 
and one wonders if Dewey is not guiltaof this very blunder when 
he speaks of concepts as "intellectual tools" and seeks to 
interpret them wholly as tools.'*' That concepts cannot be
literally interpretted as tools, then, is seen from the simple
V.
f a c t  that as we h a v e  b e e n  t r y i n g  to show, c o n cepts are not 
e n t i t i e s  or things as tools are; n o r  is s uch a view of them 
c o n s i s t e n t  w i u h  D e w e y ' s  own l e g i t i m a t e  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  r e g a r d i n g  
c o n c e p t s  as things apart f r o m  the p a r t i c u l a r s  of experi e n c e .
Further, to regard concepts as tools seems completely to 
overlook the logical significance or objective reference which 
is so characteristic of concepts. Just as in the case of sanse 
perception/
cp. Reconstruction on Phil. pp. 149 to 155, also Essays in 
Experimental Logic pp. o5-57
38.
perception, we found that Dewey, because of his biological
rassumption, was so taken up with the apprehension in sense- 
perception of meaning for activity that he completely overlooked 
the apprehension of fact - the apprehension, in other words, in 
however ffague a manner that the meaningful object exists, and 
exists the « e w e  of the agent’s needs and purposes,-so here 
Dewey seems to be so taken up with the meaning of concepts for 
activity that he is led to overlook their objective reference,
i.e. their reference to the common elements in things of wnich 
they are That this is illegitimate is seen from the
fact that the chief thing about the concept seems to be its 
objective reference, its meaning for activity depending wholly 
on whether this claim to refer to the real world is justified. 
When I think of white^for example^I do not seem to be thinking 
of mental images, nor of symbols, nor of "substitutes"fcr 
real objects,but of the white which seems to me to characterise 
some objects in the real world. This reference of the concept 
to something existing in the real world may be valid or not 
valid, but that there is this objective reference as ultimately 
included in the concept can, it would seem, be hardly denied. 
Dewey's theory, however, in line with its "behaviourism", comes
A
to regard concepts as tools which "fit" the real world^seems to 
be built on a neglect of this fundamental fact.
The attempt to interpret concepts as tools involves
ZDewey furtner in the nominalistic falacy of identifying ther
concept^ with the wor/d. Dewey himself seems never very accurate 
in/
ieconetruction in Phil. p. 150
in the use of his terminology. But it seems certain that on 
his theory there is hardly any distinction between concepts and 
words, for as we have seen according to him things are severally 
unique and particular, and concepts are tools whereby -they u>-c 
conveniently mark things off for our purposed, Concepts, then, 
become on this hypothesis no more than names under which for 
the moment we group several unique particulars. If so, it 
becomes difficult to see how they are distinguishable from words, 
for these also are rightly to be viewed a^names which we invent 
for the sake of identifying certain particulate. As against 
such a view which identifies the concept with the word or the 
name, it is only necessary to point out that the history of 
scientific terminology seems directly to testify agaihst it, for 
terms in science appear to be coined after the discovery of 
concepts and in order to symbolise them. Further, it may be 
pointed out that a view which identifies the concept with the 
word or name will lead us into the most absurd consequences, 
for the concept "white" e.g. would in that case be a name for 
lily, chalk, milk, paper, cloth, snow;etc* But to regard the 
concept, white, as a name for all these things is surely to do 
violence to language and to common thought, for it will be 
agreed by all.except those who are sworn to a theory which is 
unable to account for the phenomenon^that the concept, white, 
is not the name for a number of unique things which have somehow 
come to be grouped together, but that it refers to a property 
which all these various things have in common. Dewey himself,
it seems certain, cannot deny this; on the other hand, he himself 
seems to assume that our classifications have an objective basis 
throughout the argument which, he uses to disprove the theory that 
concepts are objective- a rather paradoxical procedure. Thus in 
expounding his view regarding concepts, he tells us, "Concrete 
things have ways of acting, as many ways of acting as they have 
points of interaction with other things.... Now different ways of 
behaving, in spite of their endless diversity, may be classed to­
gether in view of common relationship to an end. ...a basis is
#
fucnished for selecting and organising things according as their 
ways of acting are related to carrying forward pursuit... To the
execution of different purposes different ways of acting on the 
* 1 * 
part of trees are important." ( underlining mine) These state­
ments surely give up the case, for they sufficiently admit that 
the particulars which are tnus grouped together for purposes of 
"carrying forward pursuit" have all of them "ways of behaving", 
which however diverse otherwise, have at least this in common, 
that they are all alike in regard to their behaviour towards reach­
ing a certain end. Once this much is admitted- and we have seen that 
Dewey himself admits it- then it would appear that Dewey's view
that concepts are tools which "bunch" together various unique part- 
2
iculars must be discarded, for concepts appear to be not labour- 
saving devices invented by us, but forms of thought derivedAthe 
common features of the real world. We may therefore confront 
Dewey/
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Dewey with a dilemma either to he consistent with his view that 
there is no similarity between two things in the real world, in 
which case concepts will have to be regarded as tools, in the end 
the same as words, or to admit that things are similar, or have 
threads of identity running through them, in which case it would 
seem, that he will have to renounce his nominalism.
Throughout our discussion, we have gone on the hypothesis 
that concepts are for Dewey not objective in the sense that they 
do not refer to elements in the real world. But Dewey definitely 
defends himself against the charge of subjectivsm and claims thatA
his theory does preserve the objectivity of concepts. We must ex-
u.6
amine his statements in this regard. He tells^that "there is a geau
ine objective standard for the goodness of special classifications.
One will further the cabinetmaker in reaching his end while another
will hamper hims One classification will assist the botanist in
carrying on fruitfully his work of inquiry, and another will retard
and confuse him. The teleological theory of classification does
us
not therefore commit to the notion that classes are purely verbalA
or purely mental. Organisation is no more merely nominal or mental 
in any art, including the art of inquiry, than it is in a depart­
ment store or railway system. The necessity of execution supplies
objective criteria." "they (classifications) concern objective act
1
ion. They must take effect in thejworld." While all this may be 
true, it seems that if Dewey means- as he evidently does- by his 
statements in this regard to answer those who accuse him of making 
concepts/
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concepts subjective oub joe-ti-v-e , he has made use of the ambiguity of
the word, objective, to slur over trie problem witn which they en*
counter him. What Dewey means wnen he speaks o$  concepts as objectiv«
seems to be that they^ like tools, symbols and fictions, actually
exist and exist for a very real purpose. In this sense, symbols and
the most absurd fables are objective. But wnat is meant by those who
accuse Dewey's theory of subjectivism seems to be that concepts are
i.t-.
for Dewey not any more objective than symbols and fictions, that the^
A ,
do not refer for him to actual elements in thejreal world, which are 
there for us to discover, but are, like symbols and fictions, merely 
devices invented by us as suitable for our purposes. To prove that 
concepts are objective in the sense that symbols and fictions are 
objective, then, is surely not the same as proving tnat concepts are 
objective in the sense that they refer to, and are derived from, 
elements constitutive of the real world. •
Not only does tne theory of concepts to wnicn Dewey's "behavi­
ourist" psychology leads^seem to involve him tnus in subjectivism, 
but it seems to plunge him in wholesale scepticism, as is shown by 
tne following passage which deliberately makes conceptual knowing a 
case of adaptation, not a case of knowing. "There is no problem", 
Dewey tells us, "of how and why tne plough fits, or applies to, the 
garden, or the wafcchspring to time-keeping. They were made for those 
respective purposes; tne question is how well they do tneir work, 
and how they can be shaped to do it better... We do not measure the 
woEth or reality of the^tool by its closeness to its natural proto­
type/
type, but by its efficiency in doing its work- which connotes a 
great deal of intervening art. The theory proposed for mathemat­
ical distinctions and relations is precisely analogous. The# are 
not the creations of mind except in the sense in which a telephone
is a creation of mind... Both alike are works of art, constructed
1
for a purpose 'in doing the tnings which have to be done."
Concepts then would on this hypothesis appear to be related 
to the real world only in the sense that a plough is related to 
the garden. If so, it would seem, that while a concept can aid us 
in adapting ourselves to our environment, it can never claim to 
give us a wtL knowledge of the real world. Conceptual knowledge 
would therefore be knowledge only in name, a more apprppriate 
name for it will be conceptual adaptation. The concept of Con- 
servation of Energy which is so employed in the realm of Physical 
Science will be a device by which we adapt ourselves to certain 
physical phenomena, but will not be really true of the real world. 
The concepts of Mathematics again will be similar devices, not 
really characteristic of anything in the real world and differing 
from the real world in very much the same way as a plough differs 
from a garden.
The scepticism which such a position, which comes to deny all 
knowledge and to cut at the roots of Science, involves, appears to 
be strangely inconsistent in the hands of Dewey who seems generally 
to be imbued with the greatest respect for, and confidence in,
S c i e n c e •/
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Science. But starting as he does wibh the psychological 
assumptions which arise from his desire to interpret cognition 
on a purely biological level it appears that he can do no ouner.
On this hypothesis, we noticed, apprehension was not regarded as
a
giving us a knowledge of the real, so that concepts^many of wnich 
seem to be elaborated out of what is given in immediate apprehension 
are also regarded as vititated by a like malady. The rSle of 
purpose and economy is exaggerated till these assume a created ive. 
power over concepts. Abstraction which is necessary for the 
apprehension of many concepts is assumed to mutilate the real. 
Immediate apprehension of such simple concepts as substance, 
identity, difference etc., is denied, inconvenient as this is to 
a naturalistic psychology; the objective reference k  is (M’
A
characteristic of concepts is overlooked, and as a result of all 
this, and because of a desire to interpret all the facts of mental 
life in terms of utility to behaviour, concepts are hypostatised 
into tools or inventions, which are as different from things as 
a flower is from a garden - a view which involves the complete 
overthrow of the objective validity of all conceptual knowledge.
We do not seem to be mistaken, then, in thinking that it is 
Dewey’s biological psychology which contributes to his nominalistic 
iogic.
2 * Truth or Logical Validity.
Dewey’s view regarding truth seems to be so completely 
a corollary from his behaviourist psychology and his nominalistic 
view/
45.
view regarding concepts that to set it in this setting is to
understand it. If immediate apprehension provides us merely with 
stimuli to "behaviour and concepts are peeved whereby we adapt
ourselves to our environment, then, it would heera that there can
a.*be only adaption to environment, not knowledge. For, if».
knowledge is denied to immediate apprehension, then, the only
way of attainting knowledge is througn the mediation of concepts;
but since these, according to Dewey are only tools which help us
to adapt ourselves to the real world, knowledge through this 
means is also precluded. Knowledge, whetner of the mediate or 
of the immediate kind thus being denied, logically truth wnich is 
usually predicated of knowledge, acquires a new meaning in Dewey's
hands in consonance with his behaviourism and comes to be applied
f.C at
to success in adaption. Whatever leads to success in adaption or,
A  N *as Dewey is fond saying, to "reconstrucuion of experience" is,N
then, what is true.
Thus Dewey tells us, Thinking is a "Method of reconstructing
experience" and experience is "a matter primarily of behaviour,
1 n
g
a sensorl-motor matter" . Thinking takes itsjdeparture from a
situation of conflict and perplexity, which has arisen in the
course of behaviour, and it makes numerous pswaese-iese- as to how
Ckt*
to get over this conflict, and $ suggestion which, when followed,
successfully gets over the conflict, or "reconstructs experience" 
is true, the other suggestions which failed to do this are false.1 
Thus/
Reconstruction in Phil. pp. 141, 156.
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Thus arises the theory that consequences test truth, meaning by 
thist consequences in relation to the "reconstruction of experience" 
that is necessary at the moment. "If ideas ... are instrumental 
to an active reorganisation of the given environment, to a 
removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of 
their validity and value is in accomplishing this work. If they 
succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, 
true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, 
if they increase confusion, uncertainity and evil when they are 
acted upon, thep they are false. Confirmation, corroboration, 
verification lie in works, consequences. Handsome is that 
handsome does. By their fruits shall ye know them".
This view, as Dewey himself tells us, so wholly rests on
Ohi3 view with regard to "the nature of thinking and ideas", that 
it must be regarded as standing or falling with it. If there is 
no knowledge of the real world, then it would seem that there is 
no possible means of regarding the real world as the ultimate test 
of the truth^ of our hypothesis, as most will be disposed to think, 
so that the only test available for Dewey is p. wholly subjective 
one of testing a hypothesis by seeing what sort of consequences 
it leads to in behaviour.
And yet this theory seems fctrangely inconsistent when 
propounded by Dewey, for Dewey assumes throughout his argument an 
immediate face to face contact with facts, which fits rather ill 
with his subject Jtivism. For example he speaks of the necessity 
of/
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of "facing the facts", of "minute and extensive scrutinising" of
rzfacts, of careful observation of "brute facts" , for the formation 
of our hypotheses and for the testing of their truth; but how all 
this is possible on his theory, it is difficult to see,for this 
theory as we have been trying to show seems in the end to deny all 
knowledge.
The subjectivism and wholesale scepticism that the theory 
involves seems thus to be unwarranted by its own realistic 
assumptions,^ and when further we have seen, as we did, in the 
sections previous to this that the psychology and the theory of 
concepts on which Dewey's theory of Truth is based, are themselves 
unsound, then it would seem that the theory as a whole has very 
little left to recommend itself.
Dewey’s bioligical assumptions, tnen, seem to pervert his 
Logic to such an extenfc that Dewey is unable in the end to give
us a Logic. Concepts come to be regarded as tools in adapatation,
.at-and truth as success in adaption. Knowledge of the real world,
ft
whether mediate or immediate, the validity of which his own theory 
assumes and in the end rests on, comes however to be regarded as 
an enigma and a snare; and there is only adaptation. If the 
world of fact is thus wholly beyond our ken, we muBt see if the 
world of value - for our purposes, moral value - is at least 
within our grasp.
2* cp. Reconstruction in Phil. pp. 140 & 141; also Essays in Experimental 
Logic, pp. 139, 246.




Having-considered in the previous section, the influence 
which Dewey's bioltogical psychology exerts on his Logic, we are 
now to consider the view concerning moral values to which this 
Psychology and its consequent view regarding universals leads.
1. Nature of Moral Deliberation.
Dewey, in his intense love of uhe empirical and the concrete^
bases his account of moral values on a psychological analysis of
moral deliberation. He pleads for & system of morals based on
1
study of human nature, ani when thus based he tells us, that
Ethics will be found to be allied with physics and biology, and
that the facts of man will be found to be continuous with those
2of the rest of nature Without seeking to be critical, we shall
attempt in what follows to state Dewey's view as far as possible
in his own words.
Dewey concerns himself in his analysis of moral deliberation
3with moral deliberation of the fully reflective type. Such moral
deliberation, Dewey finds, is always brought about by a moral
situation; and he analysfeaes the moral situation in order to find
3out what its characteristic features are, for it seems certain that 
such a situation should provide^ us with a clue as to what is 
sought to be accomplished in moral deliberation. In line with 
his/
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his general psychology of reflection, where conflict in activity
is what provokes thought, Dewey discovers that the moral situation
is brought about by an incompatibility - this rime, an incompatibiH*
ity between desires - and in line with M s  general psychology
again, what is regarded as putting anjend to such a situation is
an action which overcomes this conflict. Thus Dewey tells us,
"A moral situation isjone in which judgment and choice are required
antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the
1Csituation - that is to say the action needed to satisfy^- is not 
stftf-evident. It has to be searched for. There are conflicting 
desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to 
find the right course of action, the right good"'*' The defining 
traits of a moral situation, then, according to Dewey, are the 
presence in consciousness of a conflict of desires and the aim 
to discover from among such apparent goods, the right good^ - 
meaning by the right goodp, the action needed to satisfy the 
situation.
If then the moral situation ifi brought about by a conflict 
between desires, when the characteristic question is regarding the 
right course of action, (right, understood in the above sense),
we have now to ask what are the distinctive elements in the kind
Coof deliberation which the moral situation leads. This^
Dewey finds, is in general not different from what takes place in 
deliberation regarding anytning that is to be done. So he begins 
with an analysis of general deliberation. Thus in di-aper-elagg the 
nature/
49.
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nature and source of moral knowledge, he says, "Our first problem 
is then to Investigate the nature of ordinary judgments upon what 
it is best or wise to do, or, in ordinary language the nature of 
deliberation. We begin with a summary assertion that deliberation 
is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing 
possible lines of action. It starts from the blocking of 
efficient overt action, due to that conflict of prior habit and 
newly released impulse to which reference has been made. Then each 
habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of overt 
action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an 
experiment in finding out what the^ various lines of possible 
action are really like ... Each conflicting habit and impulse 
takes its turn in projecting itself upon the screen of imagination. 
It unrolls a picture of its future history, of the career it would 
have if it were given head. ... We can ¿udge its nature, assign 
its meaning, only by following it into the situations whether it 
leads, noting the objects against which it runs and seeing how 
they rebuff or unexpectedly encourage it".1
The content of deliberation would then seem to be, according
to Dewey, "the making various combinations of selected elements of
habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like
H 2if it were entered upon" , or, in other words, the discovering of 
the meaning of various lines of activity suggested by habit and 
impulse, by following them to the consequences to which they would 
lead if entered upon. But even more important than this question
regarding/
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regarding the what of deliberation is the question regarding the 
wherefore of deliberation or the aim in deliberation, for all this 
effort to discover tne meaning of various proposed jjines of activity 
is meaningless apart from the purpose tor which deliberation is 
entered upon. This is of special importance in discussing moral 
deliberation, and this is the point that Dewey next turns to, first 
of all with regard to deliberation in general.
The method that Dewey adopts in discovering the ai^m of 
deliberation is to find out what puts an end to deliberation, for 
when deliberation ceases, the presumption is that the purpose for 
which it arise has been fulfilled. In the realm of conduct, of 
course, what puts an end to deliberation, is choice; so Dewey 
concerns himself with discovering what choice means nTo say that 
(deliberation) ceases is to say that choice, decision, takes place. 
What then is choice? Simply hitting in imagination upon an object 
wnich furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt:action" 
This ow >b , then oemiwn, would seem to be aim of deliberation, viz. 
to bring about what Dewey often calls, reeonstruction. "Choice 
is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of 
habits and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released 
The mind is made up, composed, unified. As long as deliberation 
pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome gales as marking the route 
of a contemplated voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the 
various factors fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds 
no annoying hindrance, when there is a picture of open seas, filled 
sails/
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sails and favouring winds the voyage is definitely entered upon.
This decisive direction of action constitutes choice".^" "Choice,
tnen, is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing
preference^, Biases that had held onejanother in check now,
temporarily at least, reinforce^ one another, and constitute a
unified attitude. The moment arrives when imagination pictures
an objective consequencepf action which supplies an adequate
ostimulus and releases definitive action" This provides an
answer to the question regarding; the aim of deliberation. "All 
deliberation is a search for a way to act... Its office is to
gfacilitate stimulation," to provide a way of acting wnich will 
unify the competing tendencies, in short to bring about reconstruct­
ion.
So far, however, we havejbeen dealing only with general
deliberation; moral deliberation is not, Dewey will tell us, any 
fcdifference. It only carries this process to completion and sees A
that the unification brought about is not an arbitrary one, but
IcuJZ
one which "does justice to all tiypes" , i.e.,to all the elements in
conflict. "... there is reasonable and unreasonable choice.
The objects thought of may simply stimulate some impulse or habit
to a pitch of intensity where it is temporarily irrestib/le. It
then overrides all competitors and secures for itself the sole right
of way. The object looms large in imagination, it swells to
fill the field. It allows no room for alternatives; it absorbs
us, enraptures, captures us away, t«&Ss ufl off out* feet by its own
attractive/
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attractive force. Then choice is arbitrary^unreasonable.
But the object thought of may be one which stimulates by
unifying^harmonising, different competing tendencies. It may
release an activity in which all are fulfilled, not indeed, in
their original form, but i$ a •sublimated' fashion ...
In deliberation of this complete type, "To every shade of
imagined circumstance there is a vibrating response; and to
every complex situation a sensitiveness as to its integrity a
feeling of whether it does justice to all facts, or overrides some
to the advantage of others. Decision is reasonable when
deliberation is so conducted"^ "Choice is reasonable when it 
induces us to act ... with regard to the claim for each of the
gcompeting habits and impulses". From this it is plain that 
moral deliberation is not different from any other kind of 
deliberation, only it is more thorough. It also seeks 
reconstruction in activity, but the reconstruction it strives to 
attain is one that will do justice to all the contending elements 
of the situation. "In snort, a truly moral (or right) act is 
one which is intelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense; it 
is a reasonable act. It is not merely one which is thought of, 
and thought of as good, at the moment of action, but one which 
will continue to be thought of as 'good' in the most alert and 
persistent reflection. For by 'reasonable' action we mean such 
action as recognises and observes all the necessary conditions."^
" The/
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"The traditional association of justice and reason hasjgood
psychologJie^aL back of it. Both imply a balanced distribution of
thought and energy," "a balanced arrangement of propulsive 
„ 1activities
This, then, is the sort of analysis that underlies 
Dewey's Ethical theory. On this view, moral deliberation is a 
process which is entered upon in a situation characterised by 
conflicting desires, in which process t h v a r i o u s  conflicting 
proposals prompted by habits and impulses, at any one time, are 
considered with regard to the consequences throu^a which they 
would lead, if adopted; the whole process being guided by an aim 
to reconstruct the situation, moral deliberation, distinguishing 
itself from ordinary deliberation regarding wnat it is wise to 
do, by its greater thoroughness in taking into consideration all 
the contending elements of the situation.
While tnis is said, there is an important negative aspect 
of Dewey's ethical theory which, in this account of the matter, 
fails to come to notice, but which nevertheless hay be regarded 
as forming a very distinctive part of his theory. It may be 
expressed by saying that the process of moral deliberation is 
not a process of subsumption. All that is valuable in Dewey's 
Ethical teaching seems to centre^ round this point. He pleads 
under tnis head for an untiring earnestness in the moral life 
which will not be content with regarding an act as of moral value 
simply because it appears to be a case of such and such a general 
rule/
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rule. He insists that each case he judged on its own merits,
according as it ameliorates existing evils, that it he studied
with as great minuteness and sc-ru^eness as the physicist employs
in his researches? for, he tells us, since eaoh situation is
"unique” and "non-reduplicable", it is utter foolishness to
regard it as morally evaluated when it is merely brought under a
general rule. "... the primary significance of the unique
and morally ultimate character of the concrete situation is to
transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence. " 1
"This ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never i$ an
exact duplicate of anything else. Consequently the good of the
situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the
basis of the exact defect^ and trouble to be rectified. It cannot
2intelligently be injected into the situation from without .
"Every act, every deed is individual. What is the sense in
rzhaving fixed general rules ...?" "It is worth noting that the
underlying issue is, after all, only the same as that which has
been already threshed out in physical enquiry. Therejto&Jit
t&nvlong seemed as if rational assurance and demonstra»©^ could be 
attained only if we began with universal conceptions and subsumed 
particular cases under them. The men who initiated the methods
fof inquiry that are now everywhere adopted were denounced in their 
day (and sincerely) as subverters of truth and foes of science.
If they have won in the end, it is because ... the method^ of 
universils confirmed prejudices and sanctioned ideas that had 
gained/
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gained currency irrespective of* evidence for them. While placing 
the initial and final weight upon the individual case, stimulated
9
painstaking /inquiry into facts and examination of principles....
After all, then, we are nnly pleading for the adoption in moral
reflection of the logic that has been proved to make for security
S ’stringency and fertility in passing judgments upon phyfccal
A
phenomena. And the reason is the same. The old method in spite
of its nominal and a^a&ssfe#c worship of reason discouraged reason,
because it hindered the operation of scrupulous and unremitting 
» 1inquiry" % • *  its effect was merely to encourage intellectual
laziness, reliahce upon authority and blind acceptance of conceptions
that had somehow become traditional. The actual advance in scienoe
2did not begin till man broke away from this method." "In morals
now as in physical science then, the work of intelligence in
reaching such relative certainity ... as is open to man is retarded
by the false notion of fixed antecedent truths ... Moral facts,
i.e. the concrete careers of special courses of action, are not
studied. There is no^f counterpart to clintcal medicine. Rigid
classifications forced upon facts are relied upon. And all fcfe-io
is done as it used to be done in natural science, in praise of
oReason and in fear of the variety and fluctation of actual
/} 4 A-
hap-pine-ee."^ In such terms as these Dewey advocates the view that 
moral deliberation of the ideally complete type is not so simple 
ae the subsuming of a particular act under a general rule, but 
requires much thought and searching enquiry. Since each situation 
is/
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is unique, it must be dealt with on its own merits. Its good 
cannot be injected into it from without, even though this 
injection come from a general rule which has acquired a "well- 
earned prestige". Moral deliberation, whose characteristic 
features we have traced above, is then not a process of subsumption.
2. Moral Ideals.-
An important part of Dewey’s Ethical teaching is
concerned with advocating what may be called an "instrumental"
theory of moral ideals. It is this that we must now state.
In his latest writings^if there is any one special doctrine
that Dewey may be said to contend against^ it is the doctrine of
abstract universals. le is intent on showing as we saw in his
Logic that these inventions, as he regards them, are but "classif-
icationffor a purpose", and that they have no more than an
instrumental value. In line with this his general theory is his
ev>
view regarding moral ideals which we shall see are for him 
generalisations from experience, human products, which have their 
reason for existing in their service in guiding moral deliberation. 
Ideals, then, Dewey would tell us, are to be called off from their 
remote home in the heavens and made to work for a living. "In 
the classic phil®ophy the ideal world is essential a haven in
A
which man finds rest from the storms of life; it is an asylum 
in which he takeB refuge from the troubles of existence with the 
calm assurance that it alone is supremely real. When the belief 
that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of men the ideal 




that collection of imagined possibilities that stimulates men 
to new efforts and realisations"-*- "... the picture of the 
better is shaped so that it may become an instrumentality of
action, while in tne classic view Idea belongs ready-made inA»
a noumenal world." The theoretical arguments which Dewey
uses to remove the halo from ideals and to regard them as
"tools" in reconstruction, centre round his view regarding their
origin, nature and function.
a) Origin. Dewey speaks of moral ideals as "patterns for
use in re-organisation of the actual s c e n e " W h a t  he means
by this may be seen from his view regarding how they come into
existence. "They arise", he says, "out of natural effects or
consequences which in the beginning are hit upon, stumbled upon
so far as any purpose is concerned. Men like some of the
consequences and dislike others. Henceforth (or till attraction
and repulsion alter) attaining or averting similar consequences
are aims or ends ... Meantime of course imagination is busy.
Old consequences are enhanced, recombined, modified in imagination.
Invention operates. Actual consequences, i .e.,effects tfiich
have happened in the past become possible future consequences of
„ 2act}still to be performed. Interest in ideals then rises and
developes^ it would seem, in a way not unlike interest in anything 
else, say, e.g. shooting. "Men shoot and throw. At first 
this is done as an ‘instinctive* or natural reaction to some 
situation. The result when it is observed gives a new meaning 
to/
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to activity. Henceforth men in throwing and shooting think of 
it in terms of its outcome; they act intelligently or have an 
end. Liking the activity in its acquired meaning, they dot only 
'take aim* when they throw instead of throwing at random, hut 
they find or make targets at which to aim. This is the origin 
and nature of 'goals of action'".^ Ideals, then, according to 
Dewey rise out of random events which happen to he like^and 
are set up in a generalised form, so that they may guide us in 
producing similar consequences. This is the positive way in 
which ideals rise; hut there is also a negative way. Ideals 
rise not only as reminders of consequences that were original^]ike A. 
hut also as the opposites of consequences that are disliked, or 
found in some way defective. Thus "The beginning is with a wish 
an emotional reaction against the present state of things and a 
hope for something different. Action fails to connect satisfactor­
ily with surrounding conditions. Thrown hack upon itself, it 
projects itself in an imagination of a scene which if it were 
present would afford satisfaction. This picture is often called 
an aim^more often an ideal. But in itself it is a fancy which may 
be only a phantasy, a dream, a castle in the air. In itself it
is a romantic embellishment of the present; at the best it is
2material for poetry or the novel“ Ideals then rise out of 
consequences that are liked, liked either because such consequences 
were actually experienced in the past and found tty he liked or 
because they are found to be lacking under present conditions and 
are/
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are held to he the very opposit^es of the factors in the present 
situation that are disliked. Idwals then originate as outgrowths 
from experience. Stated negatively ideals are not unique in 
origin, and are not revealed to us by some "original faculty of 
illumination"^. ”They... are wot things self-enclosed to be 
known by introspection”2 , but have their "source in objective
g
conditons". Their origin m e n  is "empirical", "natural", "concrete'
They come about as generalisations from past experiences which
were liked, or as reactions from defects in thei& present situation
that are disliked. Whatever it be, their home is human experience,
not, Dewey would tell us, some far off noum&nal world. If so,
what is their nature? What stuff are moral ideals made of?
b) The nature of Moral Ideals. The very fact of their
origin in ways described above convinces Dewey of their nature.
They are not rules "which simply descend out of the blue sky"
and which "have only the most mechanical and external relation to
4the individual acts to be judged" On Ibhe other hand, they are
the guiding principal« of life which have, as we have seen, grown
out of experience and have all their meaning within experience.
The essential mistake in Kant's Ethics, according to Dewey, is
5that ideals are for Kant deprived of their natural home. Dewey 
wishes to reinstate them within experience, and in doing so he 
finds/
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finds that their nature is explicable purely in "empirical" 
terms. The nature of the ideal is constituted by seizing 
upon the experiences that are liked and are wanting in the 
present situation and which in some form were originally seen 
to have good consequences ('good', in the sense of ‘liked'), 
by abstracting them from their original setting and surrounding 
them with a certain emotional halo. Thus in speaking of Plato' 
Ideas in-this connection, he says, "What are they, these Forme 
and Essences which so profoundly influenced for centuries the 
course of science and theology, save the objects of ordinary 
experience with their blemished removed, their imperfections 
feliminated, their lacks rounded out, their suggestions and hints 
fulfilled? What are they in short but the objects of familar 
life divinised beoause reshaped by the idealising imagination
s
to meet the demands of desire in just those respects in which 
actual experience is disappointing?"'*' Moral ideals, then, 
are generalisations from the goods and the i135 that are found 
in experience- 2 If such be their nature, why do they exist 
at all? What purpose do they serve? This takes us to the 
important question of the function of moral ideals.
t
c) The Function of Moral Ideals. Seeing that for 
Dewey moral ideals are generalised expressionsfrom experience 
for liked consequences, it is not very difficult to see what 
according to him is the function of moral ideals. Now that 
the/
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the mysterious halo has surrounds them is removed, they are 
seen to be but tools to present living. Their purpose is to 
guide us in conduct by suggesting to us those lines of activity 
which bring about consequences iihich have the virtue of having 
the testimony of experience to their being ]iked. The moral 
import of ideals is, therefore, above all intellectual. They 
guide deliberation in situationsre^ard-i-fig reorganisation? "it 
is the part of wisdom to compare different cases^to gather 
together the ills from which humanity suffers, and to generalise 
the corresponding goods into classes. Health, wealth, industry, 
temperance, amibbility, courtesy, learning, aesthetic capacity, 
initiative, courage, patience, enterprise, thoroughness and a 
multitude of other generalised ends are acknowledged as goods.
But the value of this systematisation is intellectual or 
analytic^/i-• Olasalficatlonjsuggest possible traits to be on 
the lookout for in studying a particular case? they suggest 
methods of action to be tried in removing the inferred causes of 
ill. They are fools of insight? their value is in promoting an̂ i 
individualised response in the individual situition".  ̂ This,
then, is the function which moral ideals are to perform} they 
are to serve as "intellectual instruments for analysfeqing 
individual or unique situations".^ They are‘'tools fafl insight"® 
’‘‘and their value is intellectual.
So much is plain. But there is a negative aspect to
62.
Dewey’s theory whicn is , and which
saying/
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saying that the import of moral ideals is intellectual, not 
imperative, i.e. that ideals are to he regarded, not as "goals" 
at realising which we ought to aim in conduct, hut are rather 
to he regarded as principal-« which give us intellectual guidance 
in reconstruction. Thus he tells us, ”The entire popular notion 
of 'ideals' is infected with this conception of some fixed end 
h 6yond activity at which we should aim. According to this 
view ends-in-themselves come before aims. We have a moral aim 
only as our purpose coincides with some end-in-itself. We ought 
to aim at the latter whether we actually do or not" "I" But such
pa view of them Dewey tells us must he given up root and branch. 
"Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of 
activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning 
and to direct its further course. They are in no sense ends 
of action. In being ends of deliberation, they are redirecting
Ppivots in action"& If asked why they should not he regarded as 
ends to action, Dewey tells us, that when moral ideals are so 
regarded, they become "frozen and isolated""? "It makes no 
difference whether the 'end' is 'natural* good like health or a 
'moral' good like honesty. Set up as complete and exclusive, 
as demanding and justifying action as a means to itself, it leads 
to narrowness', in extreme cases fanaticism, inconsiderateness, 
arrogance and hypocrisy ... The use of intelligence to discover 
the object^ that will best operate as a releasing and unifying 
stimulus in the existing situation is discounted. One reminds 







oneself that one's end is justice or charity or professional 
achievement or putting over a deal for a needed public 
improvement, and further questionings and qualms are stilled . " 1 
Thus ohe chief reason that Dewey gives for not regarding 
moral ideals as imperatives is that to regard them so, is to 
set them up as fixed and final and as demanding action as a
means to themselves; and this is, so Dewey tells us, to
encourage in^sincerity and hypocrisy, and to lead to an 
avoidance of a careful examination of the consequences of our
acts.^ Moral ideals then are not "goals of action", they are
guides in deliberation. Their authority is but the authority 
of any classification, like e.g. the classification of 
diseases that the physician makesjuse of* They suggest possible
traits to be on the lookout for in studying a particular case . 4
4Their value is intellectual . They have every right, then, 
to guide the moral man in his conduct, but not to direct or 
prescribe it. Their function is not to give law, but to giv6 
light.
3. The Criterion in Moral Deliberation.
There is no doubt that the central problem of ethical 
theory is that regarding the Summum Bonum or the ultimate 
criterion in moral deliberation. But one is apt to be
surprised in reading Dewey's latest books to find Dewey advocating
that we give up the idea of a Summum Bonum in Ethics. He tells
us that to set up a Summum Bonum in Ethics is to revert to olden
times/
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times and to proclaim a belated monarchy at a time wnen democracy 
has been legally initiated into powera MIs not", he asks, "the 
belief in the single final and ultimate (end?) ... and intellectual 
product of that feudal organisation which is disappearing 
historically He will have no such single, ultimate end.
"Ethical theory., has bean singularly hypnotised by the notion 
that its business is to discover some final end or good or some 
ultimate and supreme law. This is the common element among the
p
diversity of theory." "The question arises whether the way out
of the confusion and conflict is not to go to the root of the
matter by questioning this common element"1 "It has been
repeatedly suggested that the present limit of intellectual
reconstruction lies in the fact that it has not as^-et been
seriously applied in the moral and social disciplines. Would
not this further application demand precisely that we advance to
a belief in a plurality of changing, moving, individualised goods 
H 1and ends...?"
The roots of this denial of a Summun Bonum are to be 
found in his conception regarding the nature of universals, as 
we shall see. Dewey however seems not to pay much need to such 
theoretical considerations. He is more concerned with showing
the practical consequences that such a conception as that of a
tUUsfSJi Co Ay • \H. frruJZ trut" U^aX  U." A  C&c >rfc «
SuEtmun Bonum that has kept moral theory fruitlessly interested
in abstract^ speculations instead of contributing to the
3solution of moral and social problems. It lands us^he tells us, 
into/
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into a "bog of disputes that cannot be settled".^- Thejbelief in
2a single end or Summum Bonum leads, he tells us, to fanaticsm.
It provides "a technique of avoiding a reasonable survey of
consequences"^. "It is wilful foly to fasten upon some single end
or consequence which is liked, and permit the view of that to blot
from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences.
It is like^ supposing that when a finger held close to the eye
covers up a distant mountain the finger is really larger than the
£mountain. Not the end - in the singular - justifies the mean; for
there is no such thing as the single all-important end . " 4
If the Summum Bonum is thus to be got rid of, we must ask
if there is any ultimate criterion of moral valuation at all. In
our account of Dewey’s view regarding the nature of moral deliberation,
we discover^tnat Dewey distinguished between what he called "reasonable"
and "unreasonable" choice. An unreasonable choice^we saw, was for
him one that was made with no consideration fif all the contending
elements of the situation, but was a case of mere-iy to the most
passionate impulse of the moment, and a "reasonable" choice was one
that was made in the light of all the contending elements of the
situation and had the virtue of harmonising and unifying all these
tendencies. From this? a criterion of reasonableness or of moral
value can be derived. An act is reasonable or morally valuable
lihen it leads to harmonised activity\ and since harmonisation means
for Dewey harmonisation of factors at any one time in conflict, his
criterion may perhaps be better expressed by saying that an act is
reasonable/
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reasonable when it maintains an equilibrium amongst contending 
elements, or in Dewey's words, when it produces a "balanced 
arrangement of propulsive activities"1f i.e . when it leads to 
the most stable reconstruction of experience that is possiblejln 
that particular situation . 2
Further, -since for Dewey selfhood is a growing something 
"in process^ of making"3 , reconstruction in growth becomes the 
chief end, for unless the reconstruction was adapted to this 
changing, moving self, the reconstruction would not be a 
recons^trgtion at all. Thus he tells us that "growing, or the 
continuous reconstruction of experience is the ohly end"
In eonsonance with this, is his insistence on the present 
as the object of moral deliberation. He reiterates over and 
over again that "The present, not the future, is ours" . 3 This 
dictum gains renewed meaning when it is seen in the light of the 
criterion which Dewey has formulated. The insistence on the 
present is then seen to be the logical outcome of holding that 
the moral end is the maintaining of an equilibrium in each 
situation as it rises. If this is the moral end, then, of course, 
as Dewey says, "the good is now or ns/er."® In this connection 
he says, "The good, satisfaction, *end'^ of growth of present action 
in/
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in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our 
control, and the only one accordingly, for which responsibility 
exists. The rest is luck, fortune. And the tra/gedy of the 
moral notion most insisted upon by the morally self-conscious 
is the re^e^ation of the only good which can fully engage thought,
<*Vnamely present meaning traction, to the rank of an incident 
of a remote good, whether that future good be defined as pleasure 
or perfection, or salvation, or attainment of virtuous character" . 1 
The present situation, then, with its incompatible tendencies 
is wnat needs reconstruction, and the morally valuable act is 
that which brings about, this present reconstruction by producing 
an equilibrium among them. Thus "There is seen to be but one 
issue involved in all reflections upon conduct: the rectifying
of present troubles, the harmonising of present incompatibilities 
by projecting a course of action which gathers into itself the 
meaning of t,hem all" 2
eOne consequence of this view is that the qlmphasis in 
determining whether an act is morally good or bad is on 
consequences, as Dewey never tires of saying. "Certainly nothing 
can justify or condemn means except ends, results . " 3 Do the
consequences of an act bring about this equilibrium or do they
noti If they do, then the act is morally good: if not, it is
bad. "Enquiry, discovery, take the same place in morals that 
they have come to occupy in sciences of nature. Validation, 
demonstration become experimental, a matter of consequences. ... 
shifting/
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shifting the issue to analysis of a specific situation makes 
enquiry obligatory and alert observation of consequences 
imperative. No past decision nor old principle can ever be 
wholly relied upon to justify a course <fff action. No amount 
of pains taken in forming a purpose in a definite case is 
fiijalj the consequences of its adoption must be carefully 
not&d, and a purpose held only as a working hypothesis until 
results confirm its rightness . " 1 M .. experimental logic wnen 
carried into morals makes pvery quality that is judged to be 
good according as it arttrib'ut-es to amelioration of existing ills."
This production and maintenance of an equilibrium amongst 
incompatible tendencies is, then, the ultimate criterion in all 
moral valuation, and a definition of the moral good is expressed 
by saying that "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced 
to belong to an activity wnen conflict and entanglement of various 
incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly 
release in action»"^ and when the unification thus gained is 
brought about not by suppressing incompatible Tendencies but by 
co-ordinating them into a "balanced arrangement" . " 1
Our account of Dewey's criterion, however, cannot he 
regarded as complete till we have stated the two formulations 
of the Moral Good which Dewey sometimes puts forward and which may 
he regarded as the possible forms which, in his opinion, his 
criterion is capable of assuming. One of these is expressed by 
saying that the "growth of present action in snades and scope of
• ReconsllaSi^ in Phil. pp. 174-b" " pp. 172• Humgn Nature & Conduct p.
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meaning is the only good within our control," that "good is al-
2 £■: :
ways found in a present growth of significance in activity", and
that progress consists in the "complication and extension of the
3
significance found within experience*“ The other may be expressed
by saying that the Good consists in the full development of the
capacities of individuals. "Government, business, art, religion,
all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is
to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals
without respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And this
is all one with saying that the test of their value is the extent
to which they educate every individual into the full stature of
his possibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral
meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all polit
ical institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribut
4
ion they make to the all-around growth of every member of society," 
The relation of these formulae, or if we may so call them, 
ideals, to his criterion, is seen from the fact that this criterion 
lays down that the incompatible tendencies of the self should not be 
suppressed but coordinated, the implication being that when they are 
suppressed, the meaning of the activity wnich suppresses them be­
comes dwindled to a point, there being no opportunity of its meaning 
being widened and deepened by its being seen in relation to a vari­
ety/
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ety of considerations, (thus leading to the formulating of the 
first Ideal) and tnat in so far as these tendencies are suppress­
ed , that part of the agent’s nature which they represent is not
2
allowed to develop, but at the worst, crushed out of existence
(thus leading to the formulating of the second Ideal).. These
two Ideals, then, of increase of meaning, and full development of
capacity, appear to be based in the end on the criterion of which
we have taken note, and mucn will tnerefore seem to depend on the
validity of this criterion.




Having traced in outline the main points in Dewey’s ethical 
theory, we are now ready for a critical estimate of the same, 
taking note especially of the influence on his ethical theory of 
his biological Psychology and its consequent nominalistic Logic.
1. Nature of Moral Deliberation.
In our psychological section, we noticed that the chief 
defect in Dewey's psychology of the moral consciousness was that 
it tended to overlook the ultimate moral attitude which is so 
characteristic of that consciousness. This, we observed, was 
the result of his attempt to interpret the facts of human nature 
from a< strictly biological point of view. How far such a point 
of view gives us an adequate account of moral deliberation is what 
we must now consider.
Moral deliberation, we were told by Dewey, is a process which 
is entered into in a moral situation, a moral situation being 
described as one in which there was a conflict of desires and 
which was characterised by an aim to find the "right good".
Whatever this means, it appears that this cannot be an adequate 
analysis of the moral situation, unless the agent concerned were 
assumed to be possessed of the morally valuing attitude. That this 
must be so, would seem to follow from the fact that there may be 
a situation in which there is a conflict amongst desires, where the 




being understood in Dewey's sense of that good which will most 
satisfactorily dispose of the conflict), and yet the situation 
not be entitled to be called a moral situation. For instance, I 
may desire to eat my cake anc|have it, and I may take time to 
deliberate over the natter till I discover the "right good", but 
in spit^jof all this, it will be admitted that such a situation 
as such is distinctly non-moral, and would become moral only 
when the moral value of my eating my cake or having it comes into 
question, i.e., when the self is controlled by the morally valuing 
attitude. This morally valuing attitude, then, would seem to be 
what is most distinctive of and most flundamental to the moral 
situation; and yet, strangely enough, it hardly seems to gain 
recognition in Dewey's analysis of the moral situation. It is 
quite possible that Dewey assumes that on«, of the desires in 
conflict in a moral situation is a desire to realise what is of 
moral value. But the reason for insisting that this be not merely 
assumed, but be explicitly stated in what purports to be an analysis 
of the moral situation, is that it seems to be, as we have been, 
trying to show, what is most characteristic of the moral situation. 
Dewey seems to be aware of this when he speaks of-the characteristic 
aim in a moral situation as the aim to find the "right good"; but 
unfortunately on the meaning that Dewey has given to these words - 
viz., that which will most satisfactorily dispose of the conflict - 
the "right good" may, as we have seen, be either moral or non- 
moral/
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moral. It is not surprising that Dewey is thus unable to dis­
tinguish sufficiently clearly between the moral and the non-moral, 
for if, as wehave seen, his biological psychology tends to overlook 
the ultimate moral attitude which is distinctive of the moral con­
sciousness, then it would seem that there is hardly any way of 
distinguishing between the moral and the non-moral. We shall see 
how this one defect in his Psychology colours much of his ethical 
thinking. Here it is only necessary to point out that Dewey’s 
analysis of the moral situation seems to fail just in this, that 
it does not take account of the morally valuing attitude, which 
however, it appears that it must assume, if the situation which 
it analyses is one which brings about a process of deliberation 
which can be called moral.
This same defect is what seems to underlie also Dewey’s 
account of the nature of moral deliberation. In our exposition 
of the matter, we noticed that Dewey analysed the nature of general 
deliberation regarding what it is wise to do, in order to discover 
what the nature of moral deliberation is. This in itself may be 
quite legitimate, as giving us real inBight into the manner in 
which all deliberation regarding what is to be done proceeds.
This seems to be the chief merit of Dewey's vivid and dramatic 
account of deliberation. But there is obviously an important 
difference between deliberation which is prompted by motives of 
prudence, and deliberation where the primary motive is to discover 
the moral value of the situation - a difference which would appear 
to make illegitimate/
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illegitimate the reducing of moral deliberation in terms of general 
deliberation. The difference seems to be precisely this, that 
while in the one case the attitude of the self does not seem to be 
that which seems necessarily involved in moral valuation, iH the 
other, the self is controlled throughout, in so far as its deliber­
ation is moral by the morally valuing attitude. The point is 
obvious and is one which Dewey himself will concede. Thus he tells 
us, "A radical distinction... exists between deliberation where 
the only question is wnether to invest money in this bond or that 
stock, and deliberation where the primary decision is as|to the 
kind (underlining not mine) of activity which is to be engaged in.
c
Definite quantitative calculation is possible in the former case 
because a decision as to kind or direction of action does not have 
to be made. It has been decided already... that the man is to be 
an investor. The significant thing in decisions proper, the course 
of action, the kind of a self (underlining mine) simply doesn't 
enter in; it isn't in question"^ "... the thing actually at stake 
in any serious deliberation is...what kind of a person one is to 
become, what sort of self is in the making, what kind of a world is 
making"2. If so, it would appear that what is at stake in moral 
deliberation is precisely such questions regarding the intrinsic 
value of various kinds of selfhood that our acts imply, while in 
prudential deliberation, if we may so call what we have till now 
spoken of as general deliberation, what seems to be at stake is 
not/
• Human Nature & Conduct, pp. 217&218.
" " " pp. 216&2X7.
- 75.
such questions of intrinsic value at all, hut how to procure ways 
and means to bring about what the self has come to desire, whether 
this be morally good or bad. There are two reasons why Dewey, in
spite of seeing the distinction between prudential deliberation 
and moral deliberation, is unable, on his theory, to abide by it 
(as is evidenced by the fact that he goes to an analysis of gere ra 
deliberation regarding what it is wise to do in order to discover 
all that is characteristic of moral deliberation). One is that 
his psychology, as wehave already seen, prevents him from taking 
account of the morally valuing attitude which by its absence in 
the one case and presence in the other, chiefly differentiates 
the one from the other. The otner reason is equally important, 
and to a consideration of it we must now turn.
In examining Dewey's Logic, we discovered that one view 
which was responsible for much in Dewey's logical theory was 
traceable to his psychology, which denied thatjin sense+perception 
we have an immediate apprehension of fact. Precisely the same 
doctrine applied to the sphere of moral values is, as we shall 
see, what is responsible for much in Dewey's ethical theory. A 
psychology which isjunable to take account of immediate apprehensioi 
of fact seems unable also to take account of immediate apprehensio] 
of value, with the result that value comes to mean for Dewey some 
thing that is "instituted" after complicated processes of deliber­
ation and reflection, and as never immediately apprehended. "... 
just as determining a thing to be food means considering its 
relation/
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lation to digestive organs, to its distribution and ultimate
destination in the system, so determining a thing found good
(merely, treated in a certain way) to be good means precisely
ceasing to look at it as a direct, self-sufficient thin$ and
considering it in its consequences - that is, in it sire lation to a
1large set of other things” "Unfortunately for discussions ’to 
value’ means two radically different things: to prize and to
appraise, to esteem and to estimate... I call than radically differ­
ent because to prize names a practical, non-intellectual attitude, 
and to appraize names a judgment. That men love and hold things 
dear, that they cherish and care for some things, and neglect and 
condemn other things, is an undoubted fact. To call these things 
values is just to repeat that they are loved and cherished. To 
call them values and then import into them the traits of objects 
of valuation, or to import into values, meaning valuated objects, 
the traits which things possess as held dear, is to confuse the 
theory of judgments of value past all remedy . ” 2 For Dewey then only 
that can be rightly called a value which has been "instituted" after 
porcesses of valuation and reflection. Immediate valuation is for
him no valuation at all. It is merely "a way of behaving", a "mode
3of organic reaction" and not an "act of apprehension" and therefore 
can never give us value.
It is easily seen how if immediate apprehension of values is thus 
denied, the distinction between prudential deliberation and moral 
deliberation/
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ion breaks down, for in this case moral deliberation cannot be 
concerned with the value of various kinds of acts, but only as in 
prudential deliberation with discovering ways and means to bring 
about what is immediately liked or desired. That it cannot be 
concerned with thejralue of various kinds of acts follows from the 
fact that in order to deliberate about values at all, these values 
it would seem must be apprehended as values. For example, I cannot 
deliberate as to whether j ought to say a falsehood in a particular 
situation unless I apprehended, in however imperfect a manner, 
the value of various courses of activity that lie open to me in 
that situation. Unless I apprehended thus immediately the moral 
value of each course of activity as it presents itself in imaginat­
ion, it would seem that there can be no such thing as moral deliber­
ation. Mediate valuation, then, would seem to be impossible without 
immediate valuation, but since Dewey denies immediate apprehension 
of values moral deliberation, properly so called, would appear to 
be hardly possible on his hypothesis, with the result that in the 
end the difference between prudential deliberation and moral deliber­
ation disappears and the theory arises that the difference between 
the two kinds of deliberation lies in the fact that moral deliberatic 
is more thorough than prudential deliberation. But to regard moral 
deliberation as thus a more perfect form of prudential deliberation 
seems not only contrary to common etnical thinking on the matter - ir 
as much as this thinking distinguishes virtue from prudence - but 
would appear to be contrary to Dewey's own sharp distinction between 
prudential/
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entiULl deliberation and moral deliberation. Once again, then, 
it would seem that wemust lay this fault to the charge of Dewey's 
Psychology which is unable to take account of an immediate appreh­
ension of values, which, nevertheless as we shall see, is what his 
account of the nature of moral deliberation throughout assumes and 
which comes into full view in the sharp distinction which we noted 
that he makes between prudential deliberation and moral deliberation 
That an immediate apprehension of values is assumed in Dewey's 
account of moral deliberation is seen from the fact that he speaks 
in very clear terms about deliberation not being a process of 
quantitative measurement or of calculation of profit and loss-5-, but 
as a "dramatic rehearsal" in which there is a "running commentary of 
likes and dislikes"2 * This in itself, it is true, is not the same 
as acknowledging an immediate apprehension of values, but it is, 
it would seem, to include such immediate apprehension within it; 
for whatever else values may be, other things being equal, they seem 
to present themselves as what immediately attract the self which is 
capable of appreciating them. Thus, for example, in deliberation 
the just act as such will always present itself to the ordinary man 
as attractive and to he desired. It is this fact that Dewey seems 
to make use of when he says that in deliberation we are faced with 
conflicting desires and "apparent goods"; but the reason why in 
spite of thus making use of the fact of immediate apprehension of 
values under the general category of what is immediately desired, he 
still finds it possible to deny the capacity for an immediate
apprehension of values/
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values, seems to be that he has failed to distinguish between
what is desired and what is apprehended as a value.
is
While this said, it is necessary to remark that it is noth.
forgotten that, as we saw, Dewey distinguished very carefully
between what is immediately desired and what is judged to be a
value; but a glance at his general theory of value- into wnich
we cannot enter -here- will sufficiently show that the word value
is restricted by him to mean what is usually called economic
value. Witness, e.g., his statements, ” ...to consider wnether (a
thing) is good and how good it is, is to ask how it , as if acted
1
upon will operate in promoting a course of action.” ” ...the
lobster will give me present enjoyment and future indigestion if
I eat it...The question is not what the tiling will do- I may be
quite clear about that, it is whether to perform the act which
will actualise its potentiality. ...what force snail the thing
as means be given? Shall I take it as means to present enjoyment
or as a (negative) condition of future healths When its status in
8
these respects is determined, its value is determined...” Value, 
tnen, according to Dewey is capacity for promoting a course of act­
ion, i.e., capacity for being employed as means to attaining an
5
end that is desired. But such economic value- for such it seems t< 
be- is not what we are concerned with in distinguisning between 
what is immediately liked and what is apprehended as a value,econ­
omic value distinguishing itself from the sort of value with which 
we/
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we are here concerned by the fact that thejthing to which economic 
value is attributed is valued not because of itself but because of 
something else which follows from it as effect. While therefore 
fully agreeing with Dewey in his distinction between what is immed­
iately desired and what is regarded as of economic value, we must p
feel that this can have no bearing on the distinction that we are
trying to make between what is immediately desired and what is re­
garded as .itself valuable, which distinction it is that we accuse 
Dewey of not making and which seems important in this connection.
The distinction that exists between these two may be expressed by 
saying that while one is apprehended as the liked, the other is 
apprehended as the ought to be liked. A Just act, e.g., presents 
itself at any one time in deliberation not only as wnat is immedi­
ately desired but also as wnat ought to be desired. A similar dis­
tinction is gained by tne fact tnat what is immediately desired 
may be of no value, and wnat is of value, like classical music, 
may require a great deal of mediation before it is liked. Values 
proper, tnen, it would seem, cannot be equated with what is immedia 
ately desired, for they distinguish themselves from this by the
fact that they appear as what ought to be desired. If this dis­
tinction be granted, then it would seem that we must distinguish 
amongst desires, out of a conflict of which, Dewey tells us, delib­
eration of the moral type arrises - for some of these may be desires 
for what is merely immediately liked and others for what is not 
merely liked, but liked because it is apprehended primarily as of 
moral/
moral value. It is because Dewey thus seems to confuse intrinsic 
value with what is immediately liked that, wnile making use of the 
fact that we immediately apprehend values and desire to realise 
them, he does not see the necessity for postulating the capacity 
for an immediate apprehension of values. This confusion between 
the desired and the valuable seems to be but a consequence of that 
biological Psychology which we saw was unable to distinguish suffic
iently clearly between the moral and the non-moral, and denied whol
  —    ____
sale the validity of immediate apprehension, whether off value or of 
fact.
These two psychological doctrines, then, according to wnich 
the ultimate moral attitude which comes to expression in moral valu 
ations is overlooked, and an immediate apprehension of values which 
seemd to be a fundamental requisite of moral deliberation is denied
come to have, as we snail see, a determining influence on his ethic
al theory. Here it is only necessary to note the influence which 
these views have on his theory have on his theory of moral deliber­
ation. The# seem, as we have seen, to prevent Dewey from disting­
uishing between moral deliberation and prudential deliberation, and 
consequently, in so far as Dewey is consistent with thimself, oO 
make his account of moral deliberation an account of something so 
wholly on the non-moral level, that it hardly seems possible to re­
gard it as an account of moral deliberation.
2. Moral Ideals.
An important part of Dewey's etnical theory, we noted, was 
concerned with propounding an "instrumental" view with regard to 
moral/
moral ideals. This, again, we shall see, rises as the outgrowth 
of his biological Psychology and his nominalist,ic Logic.
The two fundamental defects in Dewey’s psychology of moral
deliberation, we observed, were that he tended to overlook the
moral attitude which characterises that deliberation, and that he
denied an immediate apprehension of moral values- both of which
facts, however, we saw, were assumed and made use of in his ac-
count of moral deliberation. We shall see that it is these same
two defects in psychology, along with his nominalistic Logic, that
underlie also his view regarding moral ideals. This is seen from
examining his view regarding the origin of moral ideals.
bv
Moral ideals, sws-Dewey told us, originate from consequences 
that are liked, liked either because those consequences actually 
occurred in the past and were found to be liked, or because ohey 
are the opposites of consequences that are disliked. In this con- 
nection his illustration is noteworthy. He says that just as target
ft
are set up because the consequences of taking aim were liked, so 
moral ideals are set up because the consequences of aiming at simil 
ar kinds of conduct are liked. Leaving aside for the moment tne 
question regarding the failure of such an account to take note of 
the moral attitude which seems to come to expression in our format­
ion of moral ideals, we may consider now far such a comparison of 
moral ideals with targets can be regarded as adequate. The point 
of Dewey's illustration seems to be that the import of moral ideals 
is tha same as that of targets used in shooting. To say this, how­
ever,/
ever, is itself to throw doubt on the theory, fur the assumption on 
which the statement is made is that as a matter of fact the import 
of the two is very different in each case, as indeed it seems to he. 
If there was in the end no difference in import between them, it 
will be difficult to show why it is that shooting at targets is 
regarded as a matter of recreation and amusement, whi{ft living 
according to moral ideals is regarded as one of the greatest concern 
of life. Dewey sees the difficulty, but seems to think that it is 
solved by saying that the difference is due to the fact that shootin 
is not a universal enterprise as morality i s t h e  presumption being 
that if it were, then targets will be regarded with as much venerati 
as moral ideals are. The question precisely is, why if aiming at 
targets and aiming at living according to moral ideals were on the 
same plane, aiming at targets is not made into a universal enterpris 
If it is replied that it is not made into a universal enterprise 
because it is not universally liked, then, would it not be all the 
more necessary, as in the case of marality, to use compulsion and 
persuasion to make people take a liking to shooting at targets? 
Further, is not the assumption(that the consequences which a moral 
life leads to are universally liked^belied by the fact that the 
consequences to which an immoral life leads (from howver limited 
a point of view these consequences are considered) are also 
universally liked, for iiYirtue is universal, Vice is at leaet 
quite as universal? To put targets on the same level as moral 
ideals, then, seems to be impossible, for moral ideals do not seem 
to/
• Human Nature & Conduct, p. 238.
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to be constituted merely by consequences that are liked. Some­
thing more seems to be necessary for their formation. Once this 
is seen with regard to tracing moral ideals to consequences in 
the past that were liked, it is needless to examine Dewey’s 
second point which sees in moral ideals the opposites to consequenc 
in the present which are disliked, for this just as much as the 
former argument bases its evidence on the merely liked. But lest 
this bhould seem toojeasy a way of getting over the difficulty, we 
may say that to reduce moral ideals to "fancies of the imagination" 
"dreams", "castles in the air", is not only quite opposed to ethica 
thinking, but it is a procedure which, as we shall see, Dewey himse 
in the end condemns. That it is opposed to ethical thinking is see 
from the fact that this thinking distinguishes very clearly between 
a moral ideal and any fancy that may run across a man's mind, for 
however much this fancy may represent a consequence which is liked 
and liked intensely, it may still be an "idle fancy" or the fancy o: 
a "fevered brain", and how are we to distinguish, the moral ideal 
from these? The point is obvious and we are feaved the trouble of 
dilating upon it by the fact that Dewey himself seems to acknowledge 
it. Thus he says, "Every end that man holds up, every project he 
entertains is ideal. It marks something wanted, rather than some­
thing existing  It is the work of faith and hope even where i
is the^plan of the most hard-headed 'practical' man. But though 
ideal in this sense it is not an ideal. Common sense revolts at 
calling every project, every design, every contrivance of cunning, 
ideal,/
ideal, because common sense includes above all in its conception
1
of the ideal the quality of the plan proposed." Up to this point 
Dewey seems to agree with common sense, although in what follows 
this passage h 6 is chiefly concerned with attacking what he calls 
the "idealistic" view which, in his opinion, exalts this quality 
till it becomes something "inaccessibly remote" and "transcendent­
al" . With this, of course, we are not here concerned, it being 
sufficient for our purposes that Dewey concedes that moral ideals 
disinguish themselves from the fancies of the vicious and the de­
signs of the cunning, not in their being any more or any lass 
liked, but in their quality. But this is a concession, which, 
while speaking much for Dewey’s willingness to face facts, would
A
appear to be most, inconvenient to his theory^ for if this ̂ true it 
would seem that the moral ideal is not obtained merely from con­
sequences that are liked, as Dewey has been telling us, but that 
the quality of what is liked is also important. If this much be 
granted, then, it would appear, as we shall se6 , certain implicat­
ions will at once follow with regard to the moral self which is 
capable of this achievement, which implications fit rather ill 
into Dewey’s biological Psychology. In the first place, it 
would appear that the self must be regarded as capable of the 
moral attitude- a fact tnat Dewey seems often to overlook, with 
tne r e s u l t , a s  we noted, that he is unable to draw any clear 
distinction between the moral and the non-moral. In accordance with 
this general defect of his Psychology, is the fact that Dewey is 
here unable to distinguish between the liked and the morally desir­
able/
Hitman Nature and Conduct, p. 259.
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able, or between the liked and the ought to be liked. He traces
moral ideals to the liked, but seems to fail to see that if they
are thus traceable to the liked, they are traceable to a particula
kind of the liked, viz., the liked from the moral point of view.
which
Dewey's biological Psychology, then,^because of his overlooking th 
moral attitude is unable to distinguish between the moral and the 
non-moraj.,seems ,to be what is in the end responsible for his trac­
ing moral ideals to the liked. Even more important than this, in 
the second place, is the fact that if the self is to be capable of 
arriving at moral ideals, it must be capable of immediately appreh 
ending the ethical quality or value of what is liked. That this 
must be so, follows from the fact that moral ideals are now regard- 
as traceable not merely to the liked but to the quality of what is 
liked. If so, it would appear that this cannot be done, unless 
this quality was capable of being apprehended by the self; and in 
order to be capable of being apprehended at all, it would seem tna 
it must be capable of being immediately apprehended, for as we trii 
to show earlier, mediate apprehension appears to be impossible apa: 
from immediate apprehension. But such immediate apprehension of
3
ethical quality or value is what Dewey repeatedly denies, so that 
if we are to (flake this denial seriously- and it seems that we must 
since it evidently forms a fundamental part of his theory- it woult 
appear that it will be impossible to regard moral ideals as traceal 
to anything more than the liked, a view which Dewey most uniformly 
maintains, but which condemns itself by the fact that it is unable 
to/
to distinguish moral ideals from all the vain imaginings of the 
idle and the vicious from which Dewey himself, we noticed, Wished 
to distinguish moral ideals.
While saying this, however, we are not unmindful of the
fact that it is open to Dewey to say that, on his theory, it is
quite possible to distinguish moral ideals from mere fancies of
the imagination, in that moral ideals, trough in the end traceable
to the liked, are traceable to what is most permanently liked.
Thus in speaking of moral principles, he says, "Human history is
long. There is a long record of past experimentation in conduct,
and there are cumulative verifications which give many principles
1
a well-earned prestige." This view when applied to moral ideals 
appears plausible, but it does not seem to be above criticism, for 
if the individual is regarded as the.one who decides whether a 
thing is what he permanently likes or not, tnen «j#ny things which 
he may permanently like, like,e.g., ice-cream, horse-riding and 
golfing, may have no moral value? but if it is the race that decide 
whether a thing is permanently liked or not, even then what the rac 
decrees as permanently liked by it, like, e.g., certain meaningless 
conventions pertaining to dressing and eating, may have no moral 
value? and in some cases, practices required of the individual by 
the race, suehjas head-hunting amomg the aborigines of Borneo, may 
be positively evil. It seems impossible, then, to trace moral 
ideals merely to the liked, even though the latter be qualified to 
mean/
Human Nature and Conduct, p.239.
mean the permanently liked.
Once again, then, wejtaust trace the roots of Dewey's difficulty 
with regard to moral ideals to his biological Psychology. The over­
looking of the moral attitude and the denial of an immediate appreh­
ension of value, which we characterised as the chief defects of 
that Psychology, seem to prevent Bim from regarding moral ideals 
as traceable to anything more than the liked - a view which Dewey 
himself, as we saw, may be found to condemn.
Further, since immediate apprehension of values|is denied, 
moral ideals are not recognised as referring to values which exist 
in the items of the real world, but are regarded as artifices 
invented by us for our purposes. This leads us to examine the nom­
inalism which thus comes to characterise his view regarding moral 
ideals. That the view follows necessarily from that psychological 
doctrine of his which denied that immediate apprehension was capable 
of revealing to us the real, is seen from the fact that once this 
doctrine Is accepted, nominalism would seem to be its logical result. 
That this must be so follows from the fact that if we are incapable 
of immediately apprehending, in however imperfect a manner, the 
moral value of proposed courses of activity, the moral value which 
we predicate of a particular course of activity cannot, it would 
seem, be regarded as actually characterising it, but must be 
viewed as merely ascribed to it by us, since ex hypothesi it is 
assumed that what is given in such immediate apprehension is not what 
is characteristic of the real world. If this be so, then moral 
ideals/
89.
ideals, wnich, as Dewey himself tells us, appear, not as the revel­
ations of "an original faculty of illumination which ... shines 
upon moral truths and objects and reveals them without effort for
precisely what they are", but as generalisations from past experi
ence of what is immediately liked or disliked, cannot, it seems 
certain, be regarded as referring to constitutive features of the 
real world; for what is a generalisation from the liked, while 
capable of being regarded as revealing to us the nature of the
self which in it comes to expression, can hardly be regarded as re­
vealing to us the nature of the objective world of things and per­
sons. Dewey s nominalistic theory with regard to moral ideals 
therefore would seem to be directly traceable to that tenet of 
his biological Psychology which denies an immediate apprehension 
of value and which we have already examined and found unacceptable.
If moral ideals are not to be regarded as referring to ele­
ments constitutive of the real world, and if it be asked how in tha
case moral ideals come to be formed at all, the only available an­
swer is the one that seems to be implied in his account of moral
8
ideals, viz., that it was convenient to abstract the elements in 
experience which were liked and to classify them under a few main 
headings so that uhey may aid us in future situatipns which require
reconstruction. Stated thus, Dewey’s theory is seen to be but an




criticised in his Logic. Substantially
therefore,/
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therefore, the criticsms there urged will be applicable here, and 
we are bn that account saved the trouble of entering into an exam­
ination of thqjgeneral assumptions on which the theory iphased.
But taking the doctrine as it appears in his Ethics, we may point 
out that Dewey's view that moral ideals, like all universals, are 
inventions manufactured by us for our purposes, while as we saw 
ultimately based on his biological Psychology, seems also to be 
necessitated by his assumption that the process whereby we arrive 
at morals ideals wo wholly distorts what is originally given in 
experience that it is concluded that what is arrived at in this 
manner cannot be true of the real world. Thus he tells us in this 
connection, "Men like some of the consequences and dislike other. 
Henceforth... attaining or averting similar consequences are aims 
or ends. These consequences constitute the meaning and value of an 
activity as it comes under deliberation. Meantime of course 
imagination is busy. Old consequences are enhanced, recombined, 
modified in imagination. Invention operates"^.
While this seems to be in the end but the application to his 
Ethics of that view which we discussed in his Logic, which regarded 
abstraction as mutilating the real, it appears to arise in his 
Ethics out of a confounding of moral ideals with fancies of the
pimagination, which also he describes under the term, ideal. Such 
fancies, it may be granted, are iijventions and are obtained by 
enhancing, recombining and modifying in imagination the things that 
are found in experience as/
1. Human Nature & Conduct, p. 225.
2. cp. Reconstruction in Phil. p. 104f.
as is clearly evidenced by tne forming of utopias and all the 
fables and myths in which literature abounds. But the reason for 
regarding these as inventions seems to be, not that they imply 
much art for their formation,(for many concepts, e.g., the con­
cept of a volcano in eruption, may require for their formation 
much imagination and art on the part of one who has never experi­
enced the objects to which they refer, and yet these concepts not 
be fictions of tha imagination but refer to things in the real 
world), but that the world as we know it does not seem to warrant 
their objective reality, while moral ideals seem clearly to disting 
uish themselves from these in that the real world seems to abound 
in particulars in which these ideals are found realised. Thus a 
unicorn is an invention of the imagination because the animal thus 
referred to actually exist in the real world; but justice surely 
cannot be regarded as thus an invention, for it seems to be an act­
ual characteristic of elements in the real world. It characterises
ce.g., all just act, all just persons and all just institutions. To
A
put moral ideals, then, on a level with fancies of the imagination 
seems to be unwarranted. At any rate, it would appear that moral 
ideals cannot be regarded as inventions merely because the fancies 
of the imagination are inventions or because^the work of imaginat­
ion and abstraction, for neither of these, as such, seem as we have 
been trying to show, to be capable of proving them to be inventions
9
To regard them as inventions, it would seem necessary over and abov 
this to show that they do not refer to elements in the real world, 
but/
but this Dewey seems nowhere in his Ethics to^ He merely assumes 
it, and perhaps rightly assumes it, for his Ethics is, as he him­
self tells us, but the application to the realm of morals of his
1
Experimental Logic. But since we have already discussed the view 
as it is sought to be maintained in his Logic, the arguments which 
we urged in that connection should be regarded as of sufficient 
weight to throw discredit on the view which regards moral Meals ae 
inventions.
Nowhere does the effect of Dewey's nominaliBtic view with re­
gard to moral ideals come to as great a prominence as it does in 
his account w h of the function of moral ideals. Thus we were told 
in this connection that the function of moral ideals in conduct 
was the same as that of targets in shooting. <tn Even more striking 
is the comparison of the function of moral ideals in conduct with 
the function of stars in sailing. Thus "A mariner does not sail 
towards the stars, but by noting the stars he is aided in conduct­
ing his present activity of sailing. A port or harbour is his ob- 
2
jective..." The analogy is meant to show that moral ideals guide
activity only in the sense that stars guide sailing, i.e., that
moral ideals are not to be regarded as "ends“ or "goals" at realis-
which action is, or ought to be, directed, any more than stars are
goals at reaching which sailing is directed, but that they are to
be regarded as useful devices by which we carry on what is to be 
unique
done, in each situation as it occurs, more effectively than is A
possible/
cp. Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp.l60&16b.
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possible without their aid. Thus justice, benevolence and truth 
are not, Dewey will tell us, values which the moral man seeks to 
realise in his conduct, but are classifications which provide him 
with the main heads by reference to which he may consider his 
bearings in each situation requiring reconstruction as it comes 
before him in deliberation. Thus arises the view that the import 
of moral ideals is intellectual, not imperative, t o  show that it 
arises in this manner is to reveal its chief defect, viz., that 
nominalistic attitude with regard to moral ideals which we have 
already criticised. It is because it is thought, e.g., that just­
ice is not a characteristic of elements in the real world, that 
it is regarded as not realisable in conduct, but is considered to 
be something as remote from a particular course of action which is 
guided by it, as a star is from the activity that is guided by it. 
Once this nominalism is denied- and we have found reasons for re­
jecting it in our section on Dewey’s Logic- it seems doubtful if 
moral ideals can still be regarded in this manner, i.e., if they 
can still be regarded as merely intellectual and as having no real 
imperative authority. This is the question to which we must now 
turn.
In our exposition we noted that the reason that Dewey gave 
for refusing to regard moral ideals as imperatives was that to re­
gard them so is to set them up as fixed and final and as demanding 
action as aSpeans to themselves', and this, Dewey considered, was 
to lead to hypocrisy in the moral life and to an avoidance of a
careful/
careful scrutiny of the many consequences that flow from each act. 
If, to regard moral Ideals as imperatives is necessarily to be 
committed to this consequence, then, we must agree with Dewey 
that moral ideals are not imperatives. But it is difficult to 
see why it should be thought that to regard moral ideals as im­
peratives is necessarily to be committed to thinking of them as 
dictating to us"what exactly is to be done in a particular situ­
ation, for it is againgt such a view that Dewey’s criticism seems 
to be urged. As against this, it is only necessary to point to 
common everyday thinking on the matter, which regards justice, for 
example, as something that ought to be done "though the heavens 
fall", but whicn at the same time may be divided against itself as 
to what justice demands in a particular situation, say, e.g., witn 
regard to property, as to a just distribution of which there may 
hardly exist any unanimity of opinion. Uncertainty, then, with 
regard to what a moral ideal demands in a particular situation 
does not seem to disparage its imperativeness, and yet Dewey’s 
criticism seems to imply that it does- a view, however, which he 
seeks nowhere, soJTar as I know, to prove. This same point of 
view seems to ̂ expression in his repeated condemnation of regarding 
moral valuation as a process of subsumption, where an act is re­
garded as morally evaluated when it is brought simply under a gen­
eral rule. It is against such a theory that Dewey’s criticism is 
directed, and rightly directed, for moral valuation of the fully
reflective type does not, even as Dewey tells us, to be so simple.
fN
But/
But it hardly seems necessary to remark that to regard moral 
ideals as imperatives is not to he forced to regard moral valuat­
ion as a process of subsumption. Dewey’s view here, as well as 
in hi3 criticism stated above, seems to be due to a failure to 
note the formal character of moral ideals. We have already noted 
that the moral ideal may be regarded as an imperative which demands 
absolute allegiance, and yet the one who so regards it be left in 
doubl as to what exactly the ideal demands in any particular situai: 
ion. This seems to be so because the ideal appears to be as such 
abstract and formal and to gain content and specific meaning only 
in terms of the concrete situation in which it is sougnt to b$,or 
is found, realised. This is confirmed by the rich variety of cases 
in which benevolence, e.g., is found realised, and the almost end­
less variety of outer act in which the self-same "spirit of bene­
volence" expresses itself. Thus allegiance to benevolence may 
lead a savage to drink the blood of the totem animal, and thus to 
pledge his life to his tribe, i. e., to pledge to kill members of 
all other tribes* while allegiance to the same ideal of benevolence 
may lead a saint to lay down his life for the members of a hostile 
tribe. The act of slaying those who do not belong to one's own 
tribe and the act of offering one's life for members of a hostile 
tribe may seem quite opposed to each other, but so long as these 
acts are prompted by motives of benevolence, the element of value 
common to them both would seem to be the same, viz., the ideal of 
benevolence which they both exemplify, each in its own way. When 
moral/
moral ideals are thus seen to be capable of being realised in an 
almost endless variety of forms, we not only come to see their 
formal character, but also to be made aware of their permanence, 
they seem now to present themselves as the values which the human 
race at all tomes and in every place has invariably recognised, 
and which each age and generation has sought to realise according 
to its own growth in "spiritual discernment"- a view which seems t' 
show in an unfavourable light Dewey’s theory of an ever-changing 
flux of "individualised goods and ends" which come and go as circui 
stances alter. Be this as it may, it would seem that if moral 
ideals must be regarded as thus formal in character and if as we 
have seen, in common opinion, they are not only regarded as formal 
in character, but ar9 in addition held to be imperative in import, 
Dewey must produce further evidence to show wnerein common opinion
is wrong in thinking of moral ideals as imperatives. But beyond tl
\
objection which we have just considered, viz., that to regard mora 
ideals as imperatives is to regard them as specifically laying dowi 
what exactly is to be done in a particular situation, Dewey gives 
no other, his opinion in the matter being apparently but the resul- 
of his nominalism, which we have already criticised and which seem;
to lead him to hold thao moral ideals are not realisable in the
Xparticulars of conduct. Once this nominalism is denied, then, it 
would seem that moral ideals cannot be regarded as merely artificii 
devices forged out of particulars to serve as "intellectual tools" 
in the work of adapting ourselves to unique situations, but must 
rather/
rather be regarded as the universals which are, or may be, 
realised in conduct. Further when these universals are found 
in common thinking to be looked upon as having imperative 
authority, they come to appear as the values which the moral 
individual seeks to realise in his own life, and in the H ie  
of the society in which he lives, for such imperative claim on 
the individual’s allegiance to themselveB seems to be what is most 
characteristic of all values rightly so-called.
Dewey’s theory of Mor&l Ideals, seems, we may then conclude 
to be the result of various doctrines which appear to be 
unacceptable - the foremost among these being his nominalism which 
seems to prevent him from seeing that moral ideals not merely 
guide conduct but are realisable in conduct, and his biological 
psychology which by its denial of an immediate apprehension of 
value appears necessarily to lead to this nominalism, and by its 
overlooking of the ultimate moral attitude that seems to underlie 
the formation of all moral ideals, seems unable to di&tinguish 
moral ideals from fancies of the imagination and dreams of what 
is liked. Ultimately, then, the entire view would seem to be 
the result of Dewey's "behaviourist” Psychology, for the 
nominalism which characterises it appears itself, as we have seen, 
to be but the logical outcome of his psychology, the rest being, 
as also we have seen, directly derived from this psychology.
3. The Criterion in Moral Deliberation.
In our exposition, we noted that Dewey vehemently protested 
against the idea of the Summum Bonum, the reasons given being, in 
the/
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the first place, that to postulate a Summum Bonum was to enter 
into a "Bog of disputes that cannot be settled", and in the 
second place, that it was to lead to a "hard and narrow rigidity" 
in the moral life. The first reason does not seem to require 
much consideration, it being doubtful if Dewey himself will lay 
much weight on it, since obviously in Philosophy we are not 
concerned with avoiding controversies for the sake of avoiding 
them, nor are we allowed to dispense away with a problem by 
saying that it cannot be solved. We have already dealt with the 
second reason insofar as we have tried to show that universals 
are formal in character. Dewey's objection, that to postulate a
Summum Bonum is to lead to narrowness and rigidity in the moral
life, will seem to hold only'if the Summum Bonum were regarded as
telling us what exactly is to be done in a particular situation.
But this, it does not seem at all necessary to maintain, it 
being quite possible to hold that the Summum Bonum exists and 
that it is formal in character- If so, we must enquire if 
there is not still a further and a much more fundamental reason 
which leads Dewey to deny the idea of the Summum Bonum. This 
is not far to seek, since it appears on the surface in his 
writings, viz. that nominalistictl attitude with regard to 
universals to which we have repeatedly referred. His view that 
universals are inventions which have no existence in the 
particular items of reality naturally goes with the view that 
each such particular item is absolutely unique and "non-reduplicabl 
and in line with this is his opinion in Ethics that each moral 
situation/
situation as it occurs is unique, with its correspondingly unique 
good. Thus Dewey tells us, "In quality, the good is never twice 
itself, it never copies itself, it is new every morning, fresh 
every evening. It is unique in its every presentation. For 
it marks the resolution of a distinctive complication of
1competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself".
If each situation has thus its own unique good then it would 
seem that Dewey is right in including that the Surnmum Bonum isA. ♦
impossible and meaningless, for the very idea of a Summum Bonum 
when rightly interpreted would seem to imply that though the good 
of each situation is particular, it is not particular in the 
sense of excluding everything which is universal, but that there 
is a common element which prevades all these particular goods 
and makes them appear as the individuations of the one ultimate 
Good. But on Dewey's hypothesis of the absolutely unique 
particular} this would seem to be quite impossible. Hence his
pdoctrine of "endless ends" and of a "plurality of changing,
moving, individualised goods and ends" , 3 "for ever coming into
2existence as new activities occasion new consequences" . When 
Dewey's nominalism is removed, then, it would seem that the 
bottom is removed from his objections against the Summum Bonum. 
Further, when it is remembered that Dewey himself, in spite of 
his protests against the idea of a Summum Bonum(did im the end 
formulate an ultimate criterion of moral deliberation, it would 
appear that the quest after such an ultimate criterion is 
inevitable in ethical theory. To a discussion of this criterion 
we/
Human Nature & Conduct p. 211; and cp. Reconstruction in Phil. pp.163-9 
" " " p. 232
Reconstruction in Phil* p* 162
we must now turn.
The criterion we found to be what Dewey called the 
"continuous reconstruction of i-t.n prvT* iiA b" or the maintaining 
of an equilibrium among incompatible tendencies in each 
changing, moving situation as it occurs. The biological, non- 
moral psychology that underlies this criterion we have already 
discussed. By way of recapitulation, we may note that this 
psychology overlooked the moral attitude which comes to 
expression in moral valuation and denied an immediate apprehensionI
of value, with the result that it became impossible for it to
iUweww-
distinguish moral deliberation prudential deliberation, moral 
deliberation coming to J&te regarded asjbut the carrying to greater 
thoroughness of the processes involved in prudential deliberation. 
In line with this appears to be Dewey's criterion which seems, 
as we have seen, to be borrowed directly from an analysis from 
what is observed to take place in a non-moral situation requiring 
deliberation before action can be entered upon - a procedure, 
natural enough when the distinction between the moral and the 
non-moral i3 abolished. To see Dewey's criterion in the light 
of his phychology is to understand it, and we seem justified once 
more in looking upon his "behaviourist" psychology as what is 
responsible in the end for his v£ew in ethics. Apart from this 
psychology, which we have already discussed, we may now consider 
his criterion to see how far it, when taken by itself, can be 
regarded as adequate.
If this criterion is understood as telling us what is 
actually/
actually aimed at in moral conduct, and if by equilibrium is 
meant equilibrium in action, then it would seem that not much 
argument in needed to throw doubt on its validity, for it is 
evident that the actual aim in moral conduct is not to attain 
equilibrium or harmony in action, as is not only amply borne 
witness to by the fact that moral conduct often produces the 
greatest discord in action and is persisted in in spite of such 
discord and conflict^, but also by the fact that to aim at 
equilibrium and harmony is often regarded as the height of 
selfishness and cowardice. Thus in a world where a Pilate is
branded as immoral for seeking to find harmony in action by
A .pleasing an angry mob, and a Jesus is defied into immortal goodness 
for refusing to yield to any harmony except the harmony with the 
"will of God", even though this meant the greatest possible 
discord at the time leading ultimately to death, it seems that 
if Dewey's criterion is to be interpreted as providing the aim 
in moral action, it is flagrantly contradicted.
In saying this however we are not to be understood to 
assert that Dewey is not aware of such a common-place fact but 
that his criterion when linked with some of the maih tenets
of his philosophy lends itself very easily to this interpretation. 
Thus when "doing", "activity", "adaption to environment" is made 
the basic categ&tory1 and thinking is regarded as what is entered 
upon at moments wnen activity is disturbed for the purpose of 
finding a course of action which will most satisfactorily dispose 
of this disturbance and allow action to go on its way free and
unimpeded/
Reconstruction in Phil. pp.84-91
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unimpeded,'*' the aim of all thinking would appear to he
"reconstruction", i.e. the discovery of a course of action which
will lead to the greatest possible poise and harmony in action,
for the on-flow of activity is on this hypothesis the main
concern, %h discord in action being on that account the greatest
malady. If this, then, be the aim of all thinking and since
moral thinking differs from this, -in Dewey's opinion,only in the
u m JULgreater thoroughness it does its work such p. removal of discord
A J
and such discovery of harmony in action would seem to be indeed
X
the aifR of mor&l thinking as well. If so it would appear to lay 
itself open at' once to the critigiam above urged.
But it is quite possible for Dewey to escape this
criticism and to assert that it is not harmonised action, in 
the sense of a smooth, undisturbed course of action, that we aim 
at in moral conduct, but that the action we aim at is one which 
will harmonise and unify all the tendencies clamyouring for 
expression in any particular aus-tlen, whether this action is
gfortunate enougji to have a smooth course or not . In interpretinj
his criterion in this sense, we seem to pass from the merely
uLa -biological point of view to a deeper psychological formation 
which interprets the conflict to be overcome as an inner conflict 
of motives. Witness, e.g. his statement "Choice is reasonable 
when/
cp. His statement, "We are striving to unify our responses, to achiwve 
a consistent environment which will restore unity of conduct". (Human 
Nature & Conduct, p. 183: Reconsutretion in Phil. pp. 139 & 9)
cp. Human Nature & Conduct p. 293. "As along as any social impulse 
endures, so long an activity that shuts itself off will bring inv/ard
dissatisfaction and entail a struggle for compensatory goods, no matter
what pleasures or external successes acclaim its course".
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when it induces us to act reasonablyy that is with regard to
i
the claims of each of the competing habits and impulses".
On this interpretation it might be argued that Pilate did not 
really secure harmony, for thoug£i the harmony secured was outwardly 
so, inwardly it was far from harmony, for the tendency to justice 
was suppressed*, and harmony, so it might be said, is not one where
discordant elements are suppressed, but one in which they are
retained and made to work together for a common end! Stated
thus, we seem to come upon Dewey's criterion in its most plausible 
form. Thus it will be remembered that Dewey distinguished between 
reasonable and unreasonable choice iliac by saying that while the 
object thought of in unreasonable choice "overrides all competitor 
and secures for itself the sole right of way", the object thought 
of in reasonable choice is one "which stimulates by unifying, 
harmonising, different competing tendencies", i.e., by releasing
"an activity in which all are fulfilled, not indeed, in their
, 2 • original form but in a 'sublimated' fashion." * The distinction
between the morally good act and the morally bad act would seem
\ •to be on this hypothesis based on the amount.j of sublimation that
is instituted in each case of all the tendencies of the self which
are seeking expression at any one time. When thus stated, it
is seen that Dewey's criterion bases itself on the assumption that
.3while the good act sublimates most, if not all, of the tendencies'' 
of the self absx® in conflict at any one time, the bad act 
suppresses most, if not all, of them. The entire issue then with
regard/•Human Hature & Conduct pp.l94&5
• The ambiguity of this eSpreslfon will be made evident in the course of 
our argument.
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regard to the validity or invalidity of Dewey's criterion would 
seem in the last analysis to eentre round this point.
Before we can donsider this, we must point out the light­
heartedness with which this criterion seems to assume that the 
¿totendency which underlie our preferences in any particular situation 
are discoverable. Thus he speaks of the reasonable choice as 
one^stimulates by harmonising "competing tendencies, apparently 
implying that each line of action which we desire has a tendency 
corresponding to it, aMd which instead of expressing itself in
A
the particular form in which it presents itself may be subllmafcfed 
to another end and thus find its fulfillment. Accordingly it 
Ĥ tsrt be said that the incompatible lines of action with which 
Pilate was faced in his judgment on Jesus, were either to
icondemn Jesus or to acquit Him, and that the corresponding tendency** 
in conflict were the desire to please the people and the desire
to do justice, and that the desire to please the people could
have been sublimated to the doing of justice.had Pilate only hot 
allowed the former to fulfil itself in the form of pleasing the 
people by arresting Jesus but in the form of pleasing people by 
doing justice in the face of all odds - an act which the people in
the end would in all probability have come to admire. While this
seems very plausible, its plausibility appears to be gained by 
artificially simplifying the problem till it becomes untrue to life;b
for, the desires which underlie our preference for any particular
line of action do not seem to be so few o n  s o  simple as Dewey's
criterion seems to imply, nor so capable of being completely analysed. 
The/
The desire to please the people, e.g., in the case of Pilate,
may itself have been but the expression of numerous other desires,
all combining together to express themselves in this particular
form. Thus it may express the desire^ to regain the lost
confidence of the people to please a particular political party,
to ensure personal safety and the safety of family and friends,
to gain a higher office in the Roman Government by successfully
averting a riot and so on almost endlessly and in innumerable
combinations. Similarly the desire to do the just act may in its
turn have been prompted by various desires running into each other
to form one complex whole. For example it may have been
f *prompted by a desire to put an end to his wife's superstitjtous 
fears and pleadinprs, the maintain the reputation of the Government 
for justice and fair play, to do justice for justice’ sake, to make 
a good impression on a friend whom he loves and respects, to 
stifle a creeping fear of what may happen to him in the life after 
death and so on. Thus the two conflicting desires seem on 
analysts to break up into a whole host of desires, all seeking 
expression through this means; and these again, may be found to 
break up into numerous others, and these in their turn into others 
and so on indefinitely, till the whole self seems to be involved 
in each line of action that is preferred.'*' If so, does it not 
seem that by basing the distinction between the morally good act 
and/
sp. Stout's statement^., "... the recognised reasons for a decision can 
lever constitute the entire cause of decision. Hehind them There always 
.iee the Self as a whole, and what this involves can never be completely 
inalysed or stated in the form of definite reasons or special motives. 
Manual of Psychology, 3rd Edit. p. 709.)
and the morally bad act on the amount of sublimâtion, that is 
instituted of "competing tendencies", Dewey's criterion has 
shifted the problem to a realm where silence would seem to be most 
consonant with wisdom? for, how are we to know what tendencies 
exactly underlay our preference for a particular line of action, 
and even if we did know this, how are we to know that, the line 
of action chosen by us sublimated more of the "competing tendencies" 
than any of the preferences with which it came into conflict?
For, in order to know this, it would seem that we should know not 
only what tendencies underlay uach of our preferences and which 
of these were sublimated and which suppressed by aulr action, but 
also what tendenciesjp/ould have been sublimated or suppressed had 
any of the other preferences been chosen, and which of theee 
preferences would have fulfilled most of these tendencies - a 
matter which in its compexity would seem to be beyond human power.
To Dewey however in line with his naturalistic psychology, 
the matter appears to be much more simple. Each complex 
preference seems to him to be reducible to some one simple tendency, 
and when thus reduced to be sufficiently accounted for. Whether 
this view is necessarily connected or not with the very inadequate 
account, which we foimd was given in hfcs psychology, of the self 
as merely the "bearer of experience" rather than as the active 
principle in all experience, still, it would seem tè te© a view which 
fails to see that each of our preferences turns out 011 analysis 
to involve the whole self and to be as complex as the self itself.





specifying what exactly is to he understood by tnis term becomes 
apparent, for it would seem to be capable of referring to any of 
an almost indefinite number of desires into which our outstanding 
preferences in a particular situation are analysable. Overlooking 
for the moment difficulties such as these which one might find in 
regard to Dewey's criterion, we must next enquire into the validity 
of the assumption on which Dewey's criterion seems to be bastd, viz. 
that while the morally good act sublimates, if not all, of the tend­
encies seeking expression in any particular situation, the morally 
bad act suppresses most, if not all, of them. Understanding by 
competing tendencies the outstanding desires which force themselves 
on the agent’s consideration in a particular situation- for this 
seems to be the most natural interpretation of the term, and one 
therfore which perhaps Dewey himself intended- it would seem that 
if Dewey's criterion id to serve, it must mean that in a particular 
situation where there are only two such outstanding conflicting 
desires, the good act will be one which sublimates the conflicting 
desire and the bad act, one which suppresses it. We must enquire 
if this is always the case, for if it is not always the case, it 
would hardly seem entitled to be regarded as providing the ultimate 
distinction between the fliorally good and the morally bad act. Thus 
a man may be well aware in a particular situation that i^-he is to 
save his friend’s life, he can do it only at the cost of his own.
i
The p a i n f u l l y  in c o n f l i c t  in s uch a s i t u a t i o n  w o u l d  seem to b e  loveA-
for hi s  f r i e n d  and love for his own life. He m a y  w i t h o u t  m u c h  h e s i t
ation decide to give his life for his friend. Is it possible in
txiis case to say that h i s  love fo r  his own life was s u b l i m a t e d  to, 
a n d  /
and found its fulfillment in, the love for his friend? Does it 
not much rather seem as though it were suppressed for the sake of 
his friend? If so, how is it possible on Dewey’s hypothesis to 
account for the moral goodness which we undoubtedly predicate of 
such an act? Further, if the agent in question had stopped to 
consider the matter, he might have found other desires rising up 
and claiming a hearing, e.g.., desire for the welfare of his family 
on whom he might fetl that his death will have ill effects; whereas 
the conflicting desire may present itself as just what it is, tfiz., 
to save his friend from death purely because he is his friend# In 
this case, it would seem that if he decided to preserve his own 
life more "tendencies" would have been sublimated or fulfilled by 
means of it than if he died for his friend in which case only this 
one desire to save his friend from death is fulfilled. In an 
instance of this kind, then, we seem to have evidence which appears 
to invalidate Dewey’s assumption that while the morally good act 
sublimates most, if not all, of the "tendencies" in conflict in a 
particular situation, the morally bad act suppresses most, if not 
all, of them; for here we seem to have an act which in spite of 
suppressing all conflicting "tendencies", even to the extent of 
putting an end to the agent himself, is regarded as of great moral 
value, while an act which fulfills more of the "tendencies" in 
conflict in the same situation is regarded as of much less moral 
value. It would seem, then, that if by "tendencies" is meant the 
outstanding desires in a moral situation, the morally good act 
cannot be defined as the one which sublimates most of these desires, 
nor/
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the morally bad act as the one which suppresses most of them.
Moreover, the subjectivism which the theory when thus inter­
preted seems to involve^would appear to present it in a definitely 
unfavourable light; for ifl Dewey’s criterion is to be interpreted 
to assert that what is morally good in a particular situation is 
that line of action which will fulfil most of the desires which 
are seeking expression in that situation, then, the moral good 
will seem to differ from individual to individual and for the same 
individual at different times, according as these desires and their 
number vary. On this hypothesis, what is morally good for the saint 
will not be morally good for the sinner, for while the former may, 
in a particular situation, have mostly desireffor the good, which 
are easily fulfilled in the good act, tne latter may, in the same 
situation, have mostly desires for the bad, all of which will have 
to remain unfulfilled if the sinner tries to do as the saint, thus 
making' the act, however good for the saint, morally bad when done 
by the sinner.
If, however, by ’’tendencies" is not meant such outstanding 
desires but the capacities of the self in the way of habits and 
impulses (to use Dewey's classification) which underlie these desir­
es, then, sinee what these are in any particular situation appears, 
as we have, seen, to be next to hB impossible exactly to judge, we 
may enquire if, when taken in the large, it is true tnat if what is 
morally good is capable tbf sublimating, harmonising and unifying 
the various habits and impulses of the self, what is morally evil
is not capable of doing the same. EDn analysis it seems indeed to 
appear that the morally evil is as capable of sublimating the varioui 
habits and impulses of the self to itself as the morally good. Thus
if to be a saint all the habits and impulses of the self must be
sublimated to the one end of living for the highest values, to be 
an effective miser seems to require equally that all the habits and 
impulses of the self must be sublimated to thebne BfeK end of hoard­
ing up money. If it is replied that in the case of tne miser, all 
the "tendencies” of the self except the one of hoarding up money 
are suppressed, it is not only difficult to see how tnat. distinguish« 
in moral value the miser from the saint, for in a similar sense it 
may be held that the saint has suppressed all his "tendencies” ex- 
cep t* the one of giving himself unreservedly to the call of tne
Good, bitit also that to speak of the miser as having suppressed all
his habits and impulses except the one of hoarding up money seems, 
when properly understood, not to be truej for it appears that un­
less his capacities, i.e., his impulses, instincts, emotions and 
sentiments, were enlisted in the service of this one end of hoard­
ing up money, his impulse to hoard up money will be left powerless 
and ineffective. The very fact, on the contrary, that the one end
of tne miser has such an all-compelling control over him, would
whole
seem to show that his self has been enlisted in its service, i.e.,/N
that all his capacities have been ppordinated by, and find their 
fulfilment/
cp. his statement, ”Our moral measure for estimating any existing arrange­
ment or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulseknd habits. Does it 
liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or timify interest?” 
Human Nature and Conduct, pp.293&4-.
1
fulfilment in a sublimated fashion (to use Dewey's expression) 
in the service of, this one end. If so, does it not seem that, 
even when "tendencies'' are interpreted as the capacities of the 
self, in the sense of habits and impulses, that underlie our act­
ive life, Dewey's criterion fails to serve, for if what is morally 
good seems to be capable of sublimating them, what is morally evil 
seems also to be capable of doing the same?
Whatever interpretation we put on the term, "tendencies", 
then, it appears that the morally good as well as the morally bad 
seem alike capable of sublimating or suppressing them, so that to 
make sublimation the criterion of moral goodness seems hardly poes-
Gible. Or, to put it in the words of the proposition with which we 
started, the maintaining of an equilibrium among all the tendencies 
clamouring for expression in each changing, moving situation, as it 
occurs, seems incapable of being regarded as what in the end dis­
tinguishes the morally good act from the morally bad act; for if
Miat is morally good is capable of maintaining sucn an equilibrium, 
what is morally bad seems capable of doin$ tne same; Dewey's view 
here being but the result of his avowed naturalistic psychology, 
which, as we saw, tended to regards^ highly complex preferences as 
reducible to some simple impulse, and when thus redueed as fully 
accounted for, i.e., for example, to regard the miser's preference 
for money as reducible to one simple impulse, and to overlook the 
fact that, far from the rest of his impulses being suppressed, they 
seem to be coordinated by and sublimated to this ^ne preference.
Whether, then, equilibrium be interpreted in the sense of 
harmony/
harmony in action, or whether it be interpreted in the sense of 
sublimation and coordination of all the tendencies of the self in 
confliet, at any one time, or in the life of the self when taken 
as a whole, it seems in the end to fail to serve as the criterion 
of moral goodness.
Turning next to the two formulae, which Dewey gives, of the 
Moral Good, the close relation of which formulae to his criterion 
we note in our exposition, it would seem tnat if the abofcl6 con­
clusion with regard to Dewey's criterion is granted, the claim of 
these formulae to validity will be considerably weakened. We may 
now consider these formulae to see how fiar they are capable of 
serving as adequate formulations of the Moral Good.
One of these, we noted, regarded growth of conduct in mean­
ing as the Moral Good, and progress as consisting injbhe"complicat­
ion anfi extension of the significance found within experience". 
Whether these suffice to define the Moral Good is what we must en­
quire. It may be granted at the very outset that the higher the 
moral development, the greater appears to be the capacity of the 
individual to perceive moral distinctions which seem entieely 
above the capacity of the savage anfi the morally undeveloped to 
make. Thus a savage may without feeling perform certain acts 
whidhjowing to the finer sensitiveness of the morally developed 
individual to the various consequences which those acts involve 
and their moral value, would appear to the latter gruesome and de­
finitely evil. It is on this undeniable truth that Dewey's theory 
seems to base itself. But the question arises whether growth of 
conduct/
conduct in meaning can itself be counted as morally good, for 
this is what would seem to be implied, when it is put forward 
as the Moral Ideal.
If greater capacity for perceiving the meaning of our 
acts is what is characteristic of the morally developed 
ihdividual it appears that that capacity is found also to 
characterise individuals who are far from moral. The "shrewd 
hard intellect" of the "realistic man of the world", of whom 
Dewey often speaks,is a good example. This man, it would 
appear, knows the meaning of what he is about and employs, 
to great advantage, this meaning in action, and when morals 
itself is defined by Dewey as "learning the meaning of what 
we are about and employing that meaning in action"1, it would 
seem that very little is left to distinguish the moral man 
from such clever schemers as Dewey himself condemns. If it 
is replied that the shrewd business man does not see the full 
meaning of his action in that he overlooks the moral aspect of 
his action, or if he does it, he does not employ it in
his action, does it not seem that the moral man also overlooks
%
many aspects of his action or if he does see them does not 
employ them in his action? The generous-hearted man, e.g., 
fails to S6 6 the meaning that Ebeneser Scrooge sees in giving 
his clerk a day off on Christmas Day with pay. To Scrooge 
such action is unfair; it is, he tells us, allowing h-io clerk 
to pickpocket his employer once a year. To the ordinary moral 
man such meaning may not suggest itself at all, and even if it 
did/
1. Human Nature & Conduct, p. 280.
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did suggest itself, it may not be employed in action, and yet 
the ordinary moral man would be considered as more moral in 
this regard than Scrooge. Does it not seem, then, that if 
the shrewd business man overlooks or fails to employ the full 
meaning of his action, the moral man also does the same, and 
that if increase of meaning can be found to i«e to the morally 
good, it can also lead to the morally bad? How then are we 
to regard growth of conduct in meaning as itself morally good, 
much less as the Moral Ideal? Dewey's view here, no doubt, 
is due to the assumption that the morally bad act suppresses 
all conflicting tendencies so that the meaning of the bad act 
comes to be regarded by him as reduced to a single all-absorbing
i
point, while the morally good act sublimates these tendencies, 
so that the good act comes to be regarded by him as capable of 
a wealth and variety of meaning, which is impossible for the 
bad act)but this assumption we have already examined and found 
unwarranted.
Once growth of conduct in meaning is found incapable 
of serving as the Moral Ideal, it would seem to follow as a 
matter of course that progress or moral development cannot be 
regarded, as it is by Dewey, as consisting in a complication 
and extension of the significiance found within experience; 
for this view, it seems hardly necessary to remark, appears as 
a matter of fact to depend for support on the view which we 
have just criticised that growth of conduct in meaning is what 
constitutes the Moral Ideal. The objections raised in that 
connection/
lib.
connection will therefore apply equally well here, and progress 
or moral development be seen to consist in more than 
"complication and extension of the significance found within 
experience"; for if such complication and extension is capable 
of leading to the morally good or to moral development^it seems 
also capable of laading to the morally evil or to moral 
degradation.' Dewey’s attempt therefore to dseied Moral Good
in terms of "increase of meaning" must, it would seem be 
pronounced a failure.
We have still to examine the alternative formulation, 
which Dewey offers us, of the Moral Good, to see how far it 
can be regarded as adequate. This formulation, it will be 
remembered, regarded the all-round growth of individuals or 
the full development of their capacities as the Moral Good.
Such a view appears at first sight very plausible; but on 
closer inspection it seems to bristle with difficulties because 
of a failure on Dewey's part to make clear what exactly the 
terms of his formula are to mean. Thus when the Ideal is said 
to be the full development of the capacities of individuals, 
it is difficult, in the absence of any guidance from Dewey, 
to know what exactly terms such as "capacities" and "full 
development" are meant to signify. Capacities, e.g.^ would 
seem to be meaningless apart from the ends in relation to which 
they are regarded as capacities - a view which Dewey himself 
may be found to advocate.^ If capacities are thus meaningless 
apart from the ends at realising which they are directed, it 
would/
1. cp. Human Nature & Conduct pp. 89-124.
would seem to follow of necessity that merely to speak of 
capacities, as Dewey does in his formulation of the Moral Good 
without saying capacities for what, is to say something void 
of any definite meaning; much more, then, void of any moral 
significance; for if these "capacities" are capable of being' 
developed to achieve what is morally good, they seem quite as 
capable of being developed to achieve what is morally evili •
Similarly with regard to "full development" no indication 
seems to be forthcoming from Dewey as to what exactly this 
is to mean, since no criterion is suggested by him as to 
what the development of these capacities consists in.
When we turn to his alternative description of the Ideal
as all-round growth, we do not seem to get very much further
in gaining a clearer grasp of Dewey’s meaning. On the other
hand, we seem to have the additional difficulty of knowing
what exactly the term "all-round" Is to mean. Is it for
example to mean an equal development of every "capacity" or is
it to mean the development of "capacities" in their right
proportion? If the former, it is difficult to see what
meaning equality can have in view of the qualitative diversity
of ends in relation to which capacities have meaning. For
example, how much development of the capacity for friendship
shall be regarded as equlllvant to how much development of/\
the capacity for mathematics? If the latter interpretation is 
meant, then questions arise as to what is to be the criterion 
by-which "right proportion" is to be determined. To such 
questions/
questions again Dewey seems to give no answer, except perhaps 
the very formal and negative answer which is obtainable from 
his moral criterion, viz., that these capacities are to be 
developed in such a proportion that the development of one 
does not conflict with the de^Lopment of any of the others.
What meaning this extremely abstract statement can have in 
any particular situation, it is difficult to say.
Thus whatever interpretation we put on Dewey's Ideal 
of full development of capacity or all-round growth of individ­
uals, we seem to be faced alike with ambiguity and lack of any 
very definite meaning. This is not surprising, since the one 
basic problem of ethical theory 3 eems to be that regarding 
the moral criterion, the various formulations of the Moral Good 
being but superstructures built on it and therefore standing or 
falling with it. It is perhaps for this reason that Dewey 
does not concern himself with stating at length or to be free 
from ambiguity, the various forms in which on his theory the 
Moral Good may be expressed, the morf; important question - and 
perhaps the only important question - being that regarding the 
moral criterion which we have already stated and discussed, 
and to which we must revert for our final criticism.
This criterion, it will be remembered, laid down that 
a line of action is morally good when it sublimates or fulfils 
most, if not all of the elements in conflict in a situation 
brought about by incompatible desires. All that a generalisatii 
from/
t U
from can rightly lead us to would seem to be that the Moral Ideal 
is the realisation of a unified and well co-ordinated selfhood^ 
which maintains its unity and co-ordination through all the 
changing, moving situations in which the agent finds himself 
in the process of living his life. But this, we have already 
seen, can be an accurate description of the selfhood attained by 
the miser as well as by the s a i n t f o r  both of them alike seemed 
able to realise a well co-ordinated selfhood, insofar as they made 
the pursuit of their respective ends the one permanent and consistent 
aim of their lives, so that to regard the realisation of a unified 
and well co-ordinated selfhood as the Moral Ideal seems hardly 
possible - at any rate, it would seem to be incapable of providing 
the necessary distinction between the moral good and bad, and 
therefore fail to serve as the one Supreme Good of which we are 
in search in Ethics.
Whether, then, we adopt the biological point of view and 
regard successful overcoming of conflict in our physical and 
social environment as the Moral Ideal, or whether we widen and 
deepen this point of view, till the conflict to be overcome comes 
to be regarded as an inner conflict of motives, and Moral Ideal 
as the attainment of a unified and well co-ordinated selfhood, which 
maintains its unity and co-ordination through all the changing 
situations in which the agent finds himself, in the end, it appears 
that neither view is capable of providing us with an adequate 
criterion of moral goodness.
In conclusion, we may point out that the factors^ which 
contribute/
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c o n t r i b u t e  to m a k e  D e w e y ’s the o r y  i n a d e q u a t e ^ s e e m  in the last
analysis to be traceable to the two fundamental defects in
his Psychology to which we have referred throughout our
discussion. l) His desire to view man wholly on the biological
level leads him to overlook, or at least to fail to take account
of, the u l t i m a t e  m o r a l  a t t i t u d e  w h i c h  ssem3 to c h a r a c t e r i s e
human consciousness: consequently no clear distinction is
made by him between the moral and the non-moral^with the result
that his criterion of moral deliberation comes admittedly to
be derived by him from an analysis of non-moral prudential
deliberation, and with the result that on examination his
criterion fails to give us any means of distinguishing the moral
from the non-moral, much less, of distinguishing the moral from
the immoral. 2) Not only does Dewey’s biological Psychology
thus fail to take account of the ultimate moral attitude which
characterises human consciousness, but, as we saw, it denied
an immediate apprehension of value with the result that Dewey
is le^d to formulate a subjective view of moral value, regarding
it as wholly determined by the success, which a line of action,
of which it is predicated, has, in satisfactorily disposing of
the conflict in one’s environment, understood in the biological
sense, or by the psychological effects (in the way of
sublimation or suppression of competing desires) that a line of
action of which it is predicated, has upon the agent in question
•JC
in each situation as^occurs, This seems to be but a parallel 




we found to characterise his Logic, and which we noted, 
prevented Dewey from passing beyond the self and its mental 
states to the objectively real. This same psychological 
doctrine which denies the capacity for immediate apprehension, 
it will be remembered, also le/jLd Dewey in his Logic to adopt 
a nominalistic view with regard to concepts which in its turn 
we found le t̂d to his viev/ regarding moral ideals, and to his 
denial of the Summum Bonum. In the end, then, it would appear, 
that if Dewey’s etnical theory is at fault, it is his biological 
Psychology and nominalistic Logic that are to blame, and since 
his nominalism itself appears to be, as we have seen, but the 
result of his Psychology, it would appear that the entire 
trouble with his ethical theory arises as a Result of attempting 
to interpret the facts of the moral consciousness on a non-moral 
biological level.
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